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Abstract
We investigate the effects of the social interactions of a finite set of agents on an equilibrium
pricing mechanism. A derivative written on non-tradable underlyings is introduced to the market
and priced in an equilibrium framework by agents who assess risk using convex dynamic risk
measures expressed by Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDE). Each agent is not
only exposed to financial and non-financial risk factors, but she also faces performance concerns
with respect to the other agents.
Within our proposed model we prove the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium whose
analysis involves systems of fully coupled multi-dimensional quadratic BSDEs. We extend the
theory of the representative agent by showing that a non-standard aggregation of risk measures
is possible via weighted-dilated infimal convolution. We analyze the impact of the problem’s
parameters on the pricing mechanism, in particular how the agents’ performance concern rates
affect prices and risk perceptions. In extreme situations, we find that the concern rates destroy
the equilibrium while the risk measures themselves remain stable.
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1 Introduction
The importance of relative concerns in human behavior has been emphasized both in economic
and sociological studies; making a 1 EUR profit when everyone else made 2 EUR “feels” distinctly
different had everyone else lost 2 EUR. A diverse literature handling problems dealing with some
form of strategic and/or social interaction in the form of relative performance concerns exists: In
both [HRAY10] and [Ped13] the social interaction component appears in the form of peer-based
under-performance penalties known as “Minimum Return Guarantees”; the comparison is usually
done via tracking a relevant market index, something quite standard in pension fund management.
Another type of performance concerns arises in problems where the agents’ consumption is taken
into account. The utility functions used there exhibit a “keeping up with the Joneses” behavior as
introduced in [Due49] and developed by [Abe90], [Abe99] (see further [Gal94], [CK01], [Góm07]
and [XZ09]); in other words, the benchmark for the standard of living is the averaged consumption
of the population and one computes the individual’s consumption preferences in relation to that
benchmark. Another type of concern criterion, an internal one, uses the past consumption of the
agent as a benchmark for the current consumption; [HERH73] introduced this “habit formation”
approach. A more mathematical finance approach, as well as a literature overview, can be found in
[ET15] or [FDR11]. These last two papers are the inspiration for this one.
In this paper we study the effects of social interaction between economic agents on a market
equilibrium, the efficiency of a securitization mechanism and the global risk. We consider a finite set
A of N agents having access to an incomplete market consisting of an exogenously priced liquidly
traded financial asset. The incompleteness stems from a non-tradable external risk factor, such as
the amount of rain or the temperature, to which those agents are exposed. In an attempt to re-
duce the individual and overall market risks, a social planner introduces to the market a derivative
written on the external risk source, allowing the agents in A to reduce their exposures by trading
on it. The question of the actual completeness of the resulting market has been addressed in some
generality in the literature, and we refer for instance to [Sch15]. Questions about pricing and ben-
efits of such securities written on non-tradable assets have been approached in the literature many
times, we refer in particular to [HPDR10] where the new derivative is priced within an equilibrium
framework according to supply and demand rules. Equilibrium analysis of incomplete markets is
commonly confined to certain cases such as single agent models ([HL93], [GPP09]), multiple agent
models where markets are complete in equilibrium ([DH85], [HPDR10], [KLS90]), or models with
particular classes of goods ([JRW10]) or preferences ([CFHP10]). An equilibrium in an incomplete
market is studied in [KXŽ15].
Although we follow ideas similar to those in [HPDR10], our goal is to understand how such a
pricing mechanism and risk assessments are affected when the agents have relative performance
concerns with respect to each other. Each agent a ∈ A has an endowment Ha over the time period
[0, T ] depending on both risk factors. Her investment strategy pia in stock and the newly introduced
derivative induces a gains process (V at (pi
a))t∈[0,T ]. For a given performance concern rate λa ∈ [0, 1]
the agent seeks to minimize the risk
ρa
(
Ha +
(
1− λa)V aT (pia) + λa(V aT (pia)− 1N − 1 ∑
b∈A\{a}
V bT (pi
b)
))
, (1.1)
where ρa is a risk measure (ρa is further described below). The first two terms inside ρa correspond
to the classical situation of an isolated agent a trading optimally in the market to profit from market
movements and to hedge the financial risks inherent to Ha. The last term is the relative performance
concern and corresponds to the difference between her own trading gains and the average trading
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gains achieved by her peers. Intuitively, as λa ∈ [0, 1] increases, the agent is less concerned with the
risks associated to her endowment Ha and more concerned with how she fares against the average
performance of the other agents in A. For instance, given no endowments, if λa = 1/2 and agent a
made 1 EUR from trading while the others all made 2 EUR then she perceives no gain at all.
Each agent a ∈ A uses a monetary convex risk measure ρa. The theory of monetary, possibly
convex, possibly coherent, risk measures was initiated by [ADEH99] and later extended by [FS02]
and [FRG02]. One special class of risk measures, the so-called g-conditional risk measures, which are
closely related to the so-called g-conditional expectations (see [Gia06]), are those defined through
Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDEs), see [Pen97], [EKR09] and [BE09]. Our use of
BSDEs is motivated by two general aspects. The first is that it generically allows to solve stochastic
control problems away from the usual Markovian setup where one uses the HJB approach in com-
bination with PDE theory, see e.g. [Tou13]. The second is that optimization can be carried out in
closed sets of constraints without the assumption of convexity for which one usually uses duality
theory, see [HIM05].
The form of relative performance concern we use and its study using BSDEs can be traced back
to [Esp10] and [ET15]. Their setting is quite different from that presented here; the authors show
the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a pure-interaction game of optimal investment without id-
iosyncratic endowments to hedge (Ha = 0 for all agents), and where the agents optimize, in a
Black–Scholes stock market, the expected utility of the gains they make from trading under indi-
vidual constraints. These two works are followed by [FDR11], where a general discussion on the
existence of equilibrium, with endowments, is given including counter examples to such existence.
Methodology and content of the paper. All agents optimize their respective functional given
by (1.1), and since the derivative is priced endogenously via an equilibrium framework, the market
price of external risk is also part of the problem’s solution. Equilibrium in our game is a set of
acceptable investment strategies for the agents and a market price of external risk giving rise to a
certain martingale measure.
In the first part of this work, we show the existence of the Nash equilibrium in our problem
and how to compute it for general risk measures induced by BSDEs. The analysis is carried out in
two steps. The first involves solving the individual optimization problem for each agent given the
other agents’ actions, the so-called best response problem. The second consists in showing that it
is possible to find all best responses simultaneously in such a way that supply and demand for the
derivative match, which, in turn, yields the market price of external risk. (We generally think of
a market with a zero net supply of the derivative; however, the methodology allows to treat cases
where some agents who were allowed to trade in the derivative left the market such that the (active)
agents in A hold together a non-zero position). We then verify that the market price of external risk
associated to the best responses satisfies the necessary conditions.
This last step is more complex. Since the agents assess their risks using dynamic risk measures
given by BSDEs, the general equilibrium analysis leads to a system of fully coupled non-linear multi-
dimensional BSDEs (possibly quadratic). We proceed using the representative agent approach (see
[Neg60]) where aggregation of the agents into a single economy and optimal Pareto risk sharing
are equivalent to simultaneous individual optimization. From the works of [BEK05] and [BE09],
we make use of infimal convolution (short inf-convolution) techniques in order to build a single
risk measure that encompasses the risk measures for each agent and through which it is possible
to find a single representative economy. We point out that in order to cope with the cross depen-
dence induced by the performance concern rates, standard inf-convolution techniques do not lead
to a single representative economy. We use the technique in a non-standard fashion via convenient
weighted-dilations of each agent’s risk measure ρa (see Section 3.2 in [BE09] and Section 4 below);
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to the best of our knowledge this type of analysis is new and of independent interest. The closest
reference to this is [Rüs13], where some form of weighted inf-convolution appears.
The second part of this work focuses on the case of agents using entropic risk measures, which
can be treated more explicitly and allows for an in-depth study of the impact of the concern rates.
In identifying the Nash equilibrium, we are led to a system of fully coupled multi-dimensional
quadratic BSDEs whose analysis is, in general, quite involved. Based on the works of [Esp10]
and [ET15], the authors of [FDR11] give several counter examples to the existence of solutions;
nonetheless, positive results do exist although none are very general, see e.g. [Tev08], [CN15],
[Fre14], [KP14], [HT14] and [JKL14]. In our case we are able to solve the system.
Findings. Within the case of entropic risk measures, we study in detail a model of two agents
a and b with opposite exposures to the external risk factor, so that one has incentives to buy the
derivative while the other has incentive to sell. In this model we are able to specify the structure of
the equilibrium. Using both analytical methods and numerical computations, when the analytics are
not tractable, we explore the behavior of the agents as the model parameters vary. We give particular
attention to how the relative performance concern rates, and thereby the strength of the coupling
between the agents, deviate from the standard case of non-interacting agents (when λa = λb = 0).
We find that when either agent’s risk tolerance increases, their risk lowers. If any concern rate λ
increases, we find that the agents engage in less trading of the derivative. This is because every unit
of derivative bought by one is a unit sold by the other and hence the gains of one are the losses of
the other. Consequently, if an agent is more concerned about the relative performance, she will tend
to trade less volume with the other. Also, as expected, we find that if it is the buyer of derivatives
whose concern rate increases, the derivative’s price decreases, while it increases in the case of the
seller.
Very interestingly, we find that the risk of a single agent increases if the other agents become
more concerned with their relative performance but that it decreases as this agent becomes more
concerned. Consequently, if the agents were to play this game repeatedly and their concern rate
were to vary over time, they would both find it more advantageous to become more concerned (or
jealous). As they both do so, the trading activity in the derivative decreases, but their activity in the
stock increases and explodes - the equilibrium does not exist anymore. Surprisingly, this behavior
is not captured at all by the risk measures! This non-trivial, and perhaps not desirable, behavior of
the system after introduction of the derivative is not without similarities with what is found in the
models of [CMV09] and [CML13]. It is a reminder that, when evaluating the benefits of financial
innovation, one should not focus of the economy of an individual agent (who sees clear benefits in
the form of a risk reduction) but really have a systemic view of the impact of the new instrument.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we define the general market, agents, optimization
problem and equilibrium that we consider. Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to solving the general
optimization problem for a set of agents having arbitrary risk measures. In the former we solve the
optimization problem for each agent, given the strategies of all others. In the latter we deal with
the aggregation of individual risk measures and identification of the representative agent, and we
solves the equilibrium for the whole system. Sections 5 and 6 contain the particular case where the
agents use entropic risk measures. In this more tractable setting, Section 5 explores theoretically
the influence of various parameters on the global risk while Section 6 focuses on a model with 2
agents with opposite risk profiles, and thoroughly explores the influence of the concern rates, in
particular, on the individual behaviors, risks, and the consequences for the whole system. We also
present numerical results. Section 7 concludes the study.
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2 The model
We consider a finite set A of N agents, with random endowments Ha, a ∈ A, to be received at
a terminal time T < ∞. They trade continuously in the financial market which comprises a stock
and a newly introduced structured security (called derivative), aiming to minimize their risk. For
simplicity we assume that money can be lent or borrowed at the risk-free rate zero. Stock prices
follow an exogenous diffusion process and are not affected by the agents’ demand. By contrast, the
derivative is traded only by the agents from A and priced endogenously such that demand matches
supply.
2.1 The market
Sources of risk, underlyings
Throughout this paper t ∈ [0, T ]. In our model, there are two independent sources of random-
ness, represented by a 2-dimensional standard Brownian motion W = (WS ,WR) on a standard
filtered probability space1 (Ω, (Ft)Tt=0,P). The Brownian motion WR drives the external and non-
tradable risk process (Rt), which is thought of as a temperature process or a precipitation index. For
analytical convenience we assume that (Rt) follows a Brownian motion with drift being a stochastic
process µR : Ω× [0, T ]→ R and constant volatility b > 0, i.e.,
dRt = µ
R
t dt+ bdW
R
t , with R0 = r0 ∈ R. (2.1)
The Brownian motion WS drives the stock price process (St) according to
dSt = µ
S
t St dt+ σ
S
t St dW
S
t , (2.2)
= µSt St dt+ 〈σt,dWt〉 with σt := (σSt St, 0) ∈ R2, and S0 = s0 > 0,
for (Ft)-adapted stochastic processes µS , σS : Ω× [0, T ]→ R, with σS > 0.
Market price of risk: financial and external
We recall (see e.g. [HM07]) that any linear pricing scheme on the set L2(P) of square integrable
random variables with respect to P can be identified with a 2-dimensional predictable process θ
such that the exponential process (Eθt ) defined by
Eθt := E
(
−
∫ ·
0
θsdWs
)
t
= exp
{
−
∫ t
0
θsdWs − 1
2
∫ t
0
‖θs‖2ds
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], (2.3)
is a uniformly integrable martingale. This ensures that the measure Pθ defined by having density EθT
against P is indeed a probability measure (the pricing measure), and the present price of a random
terminal payment X is then given by Eθ[X], where Eθ denotes the expectation with respect to Pθ.
For any such θ, we introduce the Pθ-Brownian motion
W θt = Wt +
∫ t
0
θs ds, t ∈ [0, T ].
1(Ft) is the filtration generated by W and augmented by the P-null sets. We point the reader to Appendix A for a full
overview of the notation and stochastic setup.
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The first component θS of the vector θ := (θS , θR) is the market price of financial risk. Under the
assumption that there is no arbitrage, S must be a martingale under Pθ and, from the exogenously
given dynamics of S, θS is necessarily given by θSt = µ
S
t /σ
S
t . The process θ
R on the other hand is
currently unknown. It is the market price of external risk and will be derived endogenously by the
market clearing condition and constant net supply.
The agents’ endowments and the derivative’s payoffs
The agents a ∈ A receive at time T the income Ha, which depends on the financial and external
risk factors. Specifically,
Ha = ha(ST , RT ) +
∫ T
0
ϕa(u, Su, Ru)du. (2.4)
While the agents are able to trade in the financial market to hedge away some of their financial risk,
a basis risk remains originating in the agent’s exposure to the non-tradable risk process R.
The derivative also pays a yield at a rate ϕD (received at maturity) and a final amount hD. The
payoff HD at maturity time T is
HD = hD(ST , RT ) +
∫ T
0
ϕD(u, Su, Ru) du. (2.5)
By trading in the derivative HD, the agents have now a way to reduce their basis risk. We make the
assumption that the functions ϕ and h, hence the payoffs Ha and HD, are bounded. We assume the
same for the coefficients in the dynamics of S and R.
Assumption 2.1. The processes µR, µS , σS and θS = µS/σS are bounded. The random variables HD
and Ha, a ∈ A, are bounded; the functions h· and ϕ· are continuous and bounded.
Price of the derivative, trading in the market and the agent’s strategies
Assuming no arbitrage opportunities, the price process (Bθt ) of H
D is given by its expected
discounted payoff under Pθ; in other words Bθ· = Eθ
[
HD|F·
]
. Since HD is bounded, writing the
Pθ-martingale as a stochastic integral against the Pθ-Brownian motion W θ (using Martingale repre-
sentation theorem) yields a 2-dimensional adapted process κθ := (κS , κR) such that
Bθt = Eθ[HD] +
∫ t
0
κθsdW
θ
s = Eθ[HD] +
∫ t
0
κθsdWs +
∫ t
0
〈
κθs, θs
〉
ds. (2.6)
We denote by pia,1t and pi
a,2
t the number of units agent a ∈ A holds in the stock and the derivative
at time t ∈ [0, T ], respectively. Using a self-financing strategy pia := (pia,1, pia,2) ∈ R2, her gains
from trading up to time t ∈ [0, T ], under the pricing measure Pθ (inducing the prices (Bθt ) for the
derivative), is given by
V at = Vt(pi
a) =
∫ t
0
pia,1s dSs +
∫ t
0
pia,2s dB
θ
s
=
∫ t
0
〈
pia,1s σs + pi
a,2
s κ
θ
s, θs
〉
ds+
∫ t
0
(pia,1s σs + pi
a,2
s κ
θ
s) dWs. (2.7)
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2.2 Preferences, risk minimization and equilibrium
The agents’ measure of risk
The agents assess risk using a dynamic convex time-consistent risk measure ρa induced by a
Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (BSDE). This means that the risk ρat (ξ
a) which agent a
associates at time t with an FT -measurable random wealth ξa is given by Y at , where (Y a, Za) is the
solution to the BSDE (with some abuse of notation: ρat (ξ
a) := Y at )
−dY at = ga(t, Zat )dt− Zat dWt with terminal condition Y aT = −ξa.
The driver ga encodes the agent’s risk preferences. Throughout this work we make the standing
assumption that the map ga : [0, T ]×R2 → R is a deterministic continuous function, that z 7→ ga(·, z)
is continuously differentiable, strictly convex and that ∇zga = 0 has at least one solution. The
agents’ risk measure given by the above BSDE is strongly time consistent, convex and translation
invariant (or monetary). We do not give many details on the class of risk measures described by
BSDEs, instead, we point the interested reader to [BEK05,Gia06,BE09].
For convenience, we recall the relevant properties of the risk measures that play a role in this
work: i) translation invariance: for any m ∈ R it holds that ρat (ξa + m) = ρat (ξa) − m; ii) time-
consistency of the process
(
ρat (ξ
a)
)
: for any t, t + s ∈ [0, T ] it holds that ρat (ξa) = ρat (ρat+s(ξa)); and
iii) convexity: for ξa, ξˆa FT -measurable and α ∈ [0, 1] we have ρat
(
αξa + (1−α)ξˆa) ≤ αρat (ξa) + (1−
α)ρat (ξˆ
a).
The individual optimization problem
Agent a’s total endowment ξa at maturity is given by the sum of her terminal income Ha and
the trading gains V aT over the time period [0, T ]. However, the agent compares her trading gains
V aT = VT (pi
a) with the average gains of all other agents. Thus, we define the risky position of each
of the N agents a ∈ A in the market (compare with (1.1)) at time t = T as
ξa =
(
Ha +
(
1− λa)VT (pia))+ λa(VT (pia)− 1
N − 1
∑
b∈A\{a}
VT (pi
b)
)
= Ha + VT (pi
a)− λ
a
N − 1
∑
b∈A\{a}
VT (pi
b),
where λa ∈ [0, 1] is the concern rate (or jealousy factor) of agent a ∈ A.
We make the following assumption on the concern rates λ·, whose justification will become clear
later on in Section 3.3.5.
Assumption 2.2 (Performance concern rates). We have λa ∈ [0, 1] for each agent2 and∏a∈A λa < 1.
For notational convenience we introduce the
(
R2
)(N−1)-valued vector pi−a := (pib)b 6=a and
V¯ −at := λ˜
a
∑
b∈A\{a}
Vt(pi
b) = λ˜aVt(p¯i
−a) where λ˜a :=
λa
N − 1 and p¯i
−a :=
∑
b∈A\{a}
pib. (2.8)
2 The case of λa > 1 is, as we show in Section 3.3.5, not necessarily intractable, but the analysis of such a situation is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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The risk associated with the self-financing strategy pia evolves according to the BSDE
−dY at = ga (t, Zat ) dt− Zat dWt and Y aT = −
Ha + VT (pia)− λ˜a ∑
b∈A\{a}
VT (pi
b)
 . (2.9)
Notice that (Y a, Za) depends on the strategies pi = (pia, pi−a) and we do not emphasize it in the
notation.
Next we introduce a notion of admissibility for our problem. We note that at this point we are
not specifying ga and hence the admissibility here is a general one.
Definition 2.3 (Admissibility). The R2-valued strategy process pia is called admissible with respect to
the market price of risk θ if the BSDE (2.9) has a unique solution in S2 ×H2 and if
E [〈 V·(pia) 〉T ] <∞, (2.10)
where 〈V·(pia)〉 denotes the quadratic variation of
(
Vt(pi
a)
)
t∈[0,T ]. The set of all admissible trading
strategies of agent a ∈ A with respect to θ is denoted by Aθ,a = Aθ.
We point out that in full generality each agent could have her own admissibility set Aθ,a, for
example due to different trading constraints, as in [ET15] or [FDR11]. Here we assume that the
agents have no trading constraints, aside from their strategies being integrable against the prices.
Endogenous trading and competitive equilibrium
We denote by n ∈ R the number of units of derivative present in the market. While each unit of
derivative pays HD at time T , the agents are free to buy and underwrite contracts for any amount
of HD, so that n is not necessarily an integer. We think essentially of the case n = 0, where every
derivative held by an agent has been underwritten by another agent in A, entailing essentially that
agents share their risks with each other (see [BEK05,BE09] or [HM07]). Building upon [HPDR10]
allows for a bit more flexibility as n 6= 0 is possible3. In any case, over [0, T ], only the agents in our
set A, with trading objectives as described above, are active in the market and so the total number
n of derivatives present is constant.
Equilibrium in this setting is defined below; the concept has similarities to that in [CHKP13].
Definition 2.4 (Equilibrium and equilibrium MPR (EMPR)). For a given Market Price of Risk (MPR)
θ = (θS , θR), we call pi∗ = (pi∗,a)a∈A an equilibrium if pi
∗,a ∈ Aθ for all a ∈ A and the following two
conditions hold:
1. For all a ∈ A and for all pia ∈ Aθ, Y a0 (pi∗,a, pi∗,−a) ≤ Y a0 (pia, pi∗,−a), i.e. individual optimality
given the strategies of the other agents; and
2. the market clearing condition (or fixed supply condition) for the derivatives holds:
n =
∑
a∈A
pi∗,a,20 =
∑
a∈A
pi∗,a,2t P⊗ λ− a.e. (2.11)
We call θR an Equilibrium Market Price of external Risk (EMPeR) if
3The situation n 6= 0 would be possible if, prior to time t = 0, another agent a0 /∈ A was on the derivatives market and
then stopped her activity, for instance a0 might have had as objective to buy m > 0 units, according to her own specific
criteria, in which case n = −m < 0.
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• there exists an equilibrium pi∗ for θ,
• and θ = (θS , θR) makes Pθ a true probability measure (equivalently, Eθ from (2.3) is a uniformly
integrable martingale); in this situation we name θ the Equilibrium MPR (EMPR).
Otherwise said, pi∗ defines a Nash equilibrium and satisfies the market clearing condition for
HD. The equilibrium and solution to the problem are the optimal strategies pi∗ and the EMPR θ.
3 The single agent’s optimization and unconstrained equilibrium
In this section and the one following, we study the solvability of the equilibrium problem for a
general risk measure induced by a BSDE. Prior to looking if an equilibrium market price of external
risk exists, we solve first for the behavior of the individual agent (the so-called best response prob-
lem); then, we assert the solvability of the equilibrium as a whole. We solve both results without
first imposing the fixed supply-demand constraint. The solution we present is very constructive and
it shows the layers of complexity being added to the problem. We close with the constraint problem.
Throughout this section assume a given MPR θ.
3.1 Optimal response for one agent
Optimizing residual risk
To solve the optimization problem for agent a, we first observe that, at each time t, the strategy
chosen must minimize the residual risk: The additivity of the risk measure implies (with VT =
(VT − Vt) + Vt and translation invariance)
Y at = ρ
a
t
(
Ha + V aT − λ˜aV¯ −aT
)
= ρat
(
Ha + (V aT − V at )− λ˜a(V¯ −aT − V¯ −at )
)
− (V at − λ˜aV¯ −at ).
This suggests applying the following change of variables to (2.9) (recall (2.8)),
Y˜ at := Y
a
t +
(
V at − λ˜aV¯ −at
)
,
Z˜at := Z
a
t + ζt, where ζt =
(
pia,1t σt + pi
a,2
t κ
θ
t
)− λ˜a(p¯i−a,1t σt + p¯i−a,2t κθt ) ∈ R2. (3.1)
Direct computations imply that (Y˜ a, Z˜a) solves the BSDE
−dY˜ at = g˜a
(
t, piat , pi
−a
t , Z˜
a
t
)
dt− Z˜at dWt with terminal condition Y˜ aT = −Ha, (3.2)
where the driver g˜a : Ω× [0, T ]× R2 × (R2)N−1 × R2 → R is defined as
g˜a(t, piat , pi
−a
t , z
a) : = ga
(
t, za − ζt
)− 〈ζt, θt〉
= ga
(
t, za −
((
pia,1t − λ˜ap¯i−a,1t
)
σt +
(
pia,2t − λ˜ap¯i−a,2t
)
κθt
))
(3.3)
−
〈(
pia,1t − λ˜ap¯i−a,1t
)
σt +
(
pia,2t − λ˜ap¯i−a,2t
)
κθt , θt
〉
.
Each individual agent a ∈ A seeks to minimize Y˜ a0 , the solution to (3.2), via her choice of investment
strategy pia ∈ Aθ, in other words
min
pia∈Aθ
Y˜ a0 .
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We proceed by first identifying the single agent’s best response given that all other agents have
acted; this is why we leave the dependency on pi−a explicit in the definition of g˜a above.
Before we solve the individual optimization we assume that the derivative HD does indeed
complete the market. This, of course, is verified a posteriori and case-by-case depending on the
specific underlying model.
Assumption 3.1. Assume that κRt 6= 0 and σSt St > 0 for any t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s. .
The pointwise minimizer for the single agent’s residual risk
In (3.2), the strategy pia appears only in the driver g˜a. The comparison theorem for BSDEs
suggests that in order to minimize Y˜ a0 (pi
a) over pia one needs only to minimize the driver function
g˜a over piat , for each fixed t, pi
−a
t and z
a. We define such pointwise minimizer as
Πa(t, pi−a, z) := arg min
pia∈R2
g˜a(t, pia, pi−a, z), (t, pi−a, z) ∈ [0, T ]× (R2)N−1 × R2,
and G˜a(t, pi−a, za) := g˜a
(
t,Πa(t, pi−a, z), pi−a, za
)
as the minimized driver.
The pointwise minimization problem is easily solved under the assumptions on ga and the
unique minimizer (due to strict convexity) follows from the first order conditions (FOC) for g˜a,
i.e. ∇pia g˜a(t, pia, pi−a, za) = 0. Recall that σ = (σSS, 0), then from (3.3) we have
∂pia,1 g˜
a(t, pia, pi−a, za) = 0⇔ −〈(∇zga)(t, za − ζa), σ〉 − 〈σ, θ〉 = 0
⇔ gaz1(t, za − ζa) = −θS , (3.4)
∂pia,2 g˜
a(t, pia, pi−a, za) = 0⇔ −
〈
(∇zga)(t, za − ζa), κθ
〉
−
〈
κθ, θ
〉
= 0
⇔ −θS κS + gaz2(t, za − ζa)κR = −κSθS − κRθR
⇔ gaz2(t, za − ζa) = −θR, (3.5)
where we used (3.4) to obtain (3.5) under Assumption 3.1.
We can be more precise about the general structure of Πa without having specified ga. Define
the R2-valued map Za(t,−θt) =
(Za,1(t,−θt),Za,2(t,−θt)) as:
for any (ω, t), Za(t,−θt) is the unique solution (in the z variable) to ∇zga(t, z) = −θt. (3.6)
Then, elementary re-arrangements from (3.4)–(3.5) using that za − ζa = Za(t,−θt) holds, yield
Πa,1(t, pi−at , z
a)− λ˜ap¯i−a,1t =
za,1 −Za,1(t,−θt)
σSSt
− z
a,2 −Za,2(t,−θt)
κRt
κSt
σSSt
,
Πa,2(t, pi−at , z
a)− λ˜ap¯i−a,2t =
za,2 −Za,2(t,−θt)
κRt
.
(3.7)
Optimality
Having identified the minimized driver G˜a, we let (Y˜ a, Z˜a) be the solution to the residual-risk
BSDE with terminal condition −Ha and driver G˜a, and we define pi∗,a := Πa(·, pi−a· , Z˜a· ). We now
prove that if the required results from BSDE theory hold, then the above methodology indeed yields
the solution to the individual minimization problem.
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Theorem 3.2 (Optimality for one agent). Fix a market price of risk θ = (θS , θR), an agent a ∈ A and
a set of admissible strategies pib for b ∈ A \ {a}. If
• BSDE (3.2) with the minimized driver G˜a has a unique solution (Y˜ a, Z˜a),
• and the comparison theorem applies to this BSDE,
then the minimal risk for agent a is given by Y˜ a0 and pi
∗,a = Πa(·, pi−a· , Z˜a· ) is the optimal strategy.
Proof. The assumptions on the driver suffice to ensure that the map (t, pi−at , z) 7→ Πa(t, pi−at , z)
is well defined. The proof essentially consists in applying the comparison theorem to prove the
optimality of Y˜ a0 and pi
∗,a. From the definition of G˜a as a pointwise minimum we naturally have, for
any admissible strategy pia, that G˜a(t, pi−at , z) = g˜a
(
t,Πa(t, pi−a, z), pi−at , z
) ≤ g˜a(t, piat , pi−at , z) for all
t and z. By the comparison theorem, we therefore have Y˜ a0 = Y˜
a
0 (pi
∗,a, pi−a) ≤ Y˜ a0 (pia, pi−a) for any
possible pia ∈ Aθ and the statement follows.
Remark 3.3. The above assumptions are easily satisfied in many cases. Consider for instance ga(t, z) =
〈β, z〉 + δ|z|2 with β ∈ R2 and δ ≥ 0. This driver is smooth, has quadratic growth in z, and a first
derivative with at most linear growth. A well-developed theory is available for BSDEs with bounded
terminal conditions and with drivers satisfying this kind of assumptions (in particular: existence and
uniqueness of solutions, validity of the comparison theorem). Recalling the definition (3.3) of g˜a and
remarking from (3.7) that Πa is an affine function of z (so in particular it has linear growth), we see
that the minimized driver G˜a enjoys the same properties as ga, and so Theorem 3.2 applies.
Some results exist for BSDEs when the drivers are less regular, e.g. have a first derivative only in the
weak sense. Theorem 3.2 is stated in the above fashion to avoid particularizing the results to special
examples of drivers or listing many general properties of ga. Our focus here is more on the methodology
for solving the model than on the BSDE theory.
3.2 The unconstrained Nash equilibrium
Having understood the optimization problem for one agent, finding the Nash equilibrium for
a given θ consists in solving (3.7) for the minimizing maps Πa simultaneously for all agents.
For a given t and a family zA = (za)a∈A ∈ (R2)A, we therefore look for the Nash equilibrium
Π∗
(
t, zA
)
=
(
Π∗,a
(
t, zA
))
a∈A
of pointwise minimizers. The system (3.7), for the Nash equilibrium
maps
(
Π∗,a
(
t, zA
))
a∈A
, can be rewritten in matrix form as
AN Π
∗,·,i = J iN , where Π
∗,·,i := (Π∗,a,i,Π∗,b,i, · · · ,Π∗,N,i) ∈ RN×1 and i ∈ {1, 2}, (3.8)
and where the a-th entries, Ja,iN , of the vectors J
1
N and J
2
N are respectively given by
Ja,1N :=
za,1 −Za,1(t,−θt)
σSSt
− z
a,2 −Za,2(t,−θt)
κRt
κS
σSS
and Ja,2N :=
za,2 −Za,2(t,−θt)
κRt
,
and the N ×N -matrix AN is explicitly given by
AN =
 1 −
λa
N−1
. . .
− λNN−1 1
 , (3.9)
i.e. the j-th line has the entries −λ˜j = −λj/(N − 1), everywhere but for the j-th one which is 1.
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Proposition 3.4. Under Assumption 2.2 the matrix AN is invertible. Moreover, for every market price
of external risk θR fixed a priori, there exists a Nash equilibrium for the agents.
Proof. The determinant of the AN is
det(AN ) = 1−
∑
i<j
λ˜iλ˜j − 2
∑
i<j<k
λ˜iλ˜j λ˜k − 3
∑
i<j<k<l
λ˜iλ˜j λ˜kλ˜l − . . .− (N − 1)
N∏
i=1
λ˜i.
If λa = 1 for all a ∈ A, then det(AN ) = 1 −
∑N
k=2
k−1
(N−1)k
(
N
k
)
= 0, so the matrix is not invertible.
The determinant is decreasing in each λ˜a (a ∈ A) and therefore also in λa. Hence, if λa ∈ [0, 1] for
all a ∈ A and if the product ∏a∈A λa < 1, then at least one factor must be strictly smaller than one,
hence the determinant must be positive, i.e. det(AN ) > 0, hence the invertibility.
The Nash equilibrium follows from Theorem 3.2 and the above invertibility result.
Let us make two remarks: First, if λb = 0 for all b ∈ A \ {a}, then AN is invertible independent
of λa, i.e. in particular for λa = 1. This shows that the condition λa ∈ [0, 1) for all a ∈ A would be
too strict. Second, if we were to allow for λa > 1, then
∏
a λ
a < 1 is not sufficient for invertibility of
AN , e.g. in the case N = 3 take λa = λb = 2 and λc = 0.
3.3 An example: entropic agents or the entropic risk measure case
We now illustrate the methodology and result of Theorem 3.2 for a particular risk measure,
which prepares the ground for the model we study in Sections 5 and 6. We give a sequence of
examples, in increasing order of complexity, that show how the structure of the optimal strategies
is changing as features are added. As in the above subsections, the examples do not yet take into
account the market clearing condition but rather assume that a market price of risk θ = (θS , θR) is
given. Nonetheless they give a flavor for the next section where the equilibrium market price of risk
is derived.
We assume that each agent a is assessing her risk using the entropic risk measure ρa, that is the
one associated with the driver ga : R2 → R defined by
ga(z) :=
1
2γa
|z|2, where γa > 0 is agent a’s risk tolerance, (3.10)
and 1/γa is agent a’s risk aversion. This choice of ga relates to exponential utilities, and we have
(see e.g. [Car09], [FK11] or [HIM05])
ρa(ξ) = Y a0 = γa lnE[e−ξ/γa ] = γa ln
(− Uγa(ξ)) with Uγa(ξ) = E[−e−ξ/γa ],
so that, equivalently, the agents are maximizing their expected (exponential) utility.
In what follows, the optimal strategies were computed using the techniques described so far and
hence we omit the calculations. They boil down to finding the correct Z arising from (3.6), then
injecting (3.7) in (3.3) and computing the outcome. The computations are straightforward as the
LHS of (3.7) appears explicitly in (3.3).
We denote throughout pi∗,a (for a ∈ A) the optimal Nash equilibrium strategy.
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3.3.1 The reference case of a single agent
For comparison, we first give the optimal strategy for a single agent who could trade liquidly in
the stock of price S and the derivative of price B with (arbitrary and exogenously-given) market
price θ = (θS , θR). She aims at minimizing her risk, with terminal endowment and trading gains
ξa = Ha +V aT (pi
a). Here, other agents do not play a role. Since ga
zi
(z) = zi/γa, it is easily found that
Za(t,−θt) := (−γaθSt ,−γaθRt ) = −γaθt. Injecting (3.7) in (3.3) yields the minimized driver G˜a,
G˜a(t, za) = g˜a
(
t,Πa(t, pi−a, za), pi−a, za
)
= −γa
2
|θt|2 − 〈za, θt〉 .
The minimized risk is then given by Y a0 = Y˜
a
0 where (Y˜
a, Z˜a) is the solution to the BSDE with
terminal condition −Ha and driver G˜a, while the optimal strategy is then given by
pi∗,a,1 =
Z˜a,1 + γaθ
S
σSS
− Z˜
a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
κS
σSS
and pi∗,a,2 =
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
.
This result is expected and in line with canonical mathematical finance results. The particular struc-
ture of the optimal strategy follows from the fact that the second asset is correlated to the first when
κS 6= 0, and the inversion of the volatility matrix for the 2-dimensional price (S,B),[
σSS κS
0 κR
]
.
The market faced by a is complete; the driver for the minimized residual risk Y˜ a is affine and
Y˜ a0 = Eθ
[
−Ha − γa
2
∫ T
0
|θu|2du
]
= E
[
EθT
(
−Ha − γa
2
∫ T
0
|θu|2du
)]
.
The minimized risk is linear with respect to Ha – all the risk is hedged away.
3.3.2 The reference case of a single agent that cannot trade in the derivative
It is also instructive, and will be useful later on, to look at the case where this single agent cannot
trade in the derivative, and hence faces an incomplete market. We first enforce pia,2 = 0 on (3.3),
then we optimize over pia,1 (as in (3.4)-(3.5)). The minimized driver following the calculations is
G˜a(t, z) = −γa
2
(θSt )
2 − z1 θSt +
1
2γa
(z2)2.
The minimized risk is then given by Y a0 = Y˜
a
0 where (Y˜
a, Z˜a) is the solution to the BSDE with
terminal condition −Ha and the above driver G˜a, while the optimal strategy is
pi∗,a,1 =
Z˜a,1 + γaθ
S
σSS
and pi∗,a,2 = 0.
3.3.3 The case of multiple agents without relative performance concerns
We return to the full set of agents A and take λa = 0 for all a ∈ A; this is the setting covered in
[HPDR10]. We find the minimized risk-driver for agent a to be
G˜a(t, za) = −γa
2
|θt|2 − 〈za, θt〉 .
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The minimized risk given by Y a0 = Y˜
a
0 where (Y˜
a, Z˜a) solves the BSDE with terminal condition −Ha
and minimized driver G˜a, while the optimal strategies are given by
piλ=0,a,1 :=
Z˜a,1 + γaθ
S
σSS
− Z˜
a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
κS
σSS
and piλ=0,a,2 :=
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
(3.11)
Observe that in this case the strategy piλ=0,a followed by a does not depend directly on the strategies
of the other agents; its structure is the same as for an agent alone. However, when the price dy-
namics of the derivative is not fixed but emerges from the equilibrium, the other agents’ strategies
appear indirectly via θR and κ.
3.3.4 The case of multiple agents without relative performance concerns in zero net supply
If one would want to take into account the endogenous trading of the derivative in the particular
situation of pure risk trading, where one takes n = 0 in (2.11), then the market price of external
risk θR cannot be fixed arbitrarily. As done above, we must impose
∑
a pi
λ=0,a,2 = 0.
It is not difficult to see, summing the last equation in (3.11) over a ∈ A, that this requires that
θR = −∑a Z˜a/∑a γa. However the Z˜as are themselves found by solving a system of N BSDEs
which involve θR. Replacing θR by the expression above in the said system of equations leads to a
fully coupled system of quadratic BSDEs that is hard to solve in general. We solve this problem with
an alternative tool in Section 4.
3.3.5 The general case: multiple agents with performance concerns
In the general case, we obtain the minimal driver injecting again (3.7) in (3.3),
G˜a(t, za) = −γa
2
|θt|2 − 〈za, θt〉 . (3.12)
The minimized risk is then given by Y a0 = Y˜
a
0 where (Y˜
a, Z˜a) is the solution to the BSDE with
terminal condition −Ha and driver G˜a, while the optimal strategies pi∗ = (pi∗,a)a∈A are such that
pi∗,a,1 − λ˜a
∑
b6=a
pi∗,b,1 =
Z˜a,1 + γaθ
S
σSS
− Z˜
a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
κS
σSS
(3.13)
pi∗,a,2 − λ˜a
∑
b6=a
pi∗,b,2 =
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
. (3.14)
The general invertibility of the systems (3.13) and (3.14) given θ is guaranteed by Proposition 3.4.
3.3.6 The general case: multiple agents with performance concerns in zero net supply
If one imposes (2.11) with n = 0, implying that
∑
b∈A\{a} pi
∗,b,2 = −pi∗,a,2, then the linear system
(3.14) for the investment in the derivative simplifies greatly and its solution is explicitly given by
pi∗,a,2 =
1
1 + λ˜a
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
for all a. (3.15)
Notice how the structure of the optimal investment strategy for the derivative in (3.15) is that of
(3.11), scaled down by the factor 1
1+λ˜a
.
In Section 6 we study a model with two agents and computations will be done explicitly for the
investment in the stock (i.e. the inversion of the system (3.13)).
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3.4 Reduction to zero net supply
In this section we give an auxiliary result allowing to simplify the yet to be used condition
(2.11). We show how the initial holdings pia,2
0− = pi
a,2
0 6= 0 before/at the beginning of the game can
be reduced to the case where pia,2
0− = pi
a,2
0 = 0. This allows us to apply (2.11) with n = 0, which will
prove crucial in later computations. The reduction to n = 0 is based on the monotonicity of the risk
measures and the following lemma, stated from the point of view of one agent a ∈ A. To avoid a
notational overload, we omit explicit dependencies on pi−a in this subsection.
Lemma 3.5. For a given MPR θ and admissible strategies pi−a = (pib)b∈A\{a}, consider the dynamics of
the residual risk BSDE
−dY˜ at (pia) = g˜a
(
t, piat , Z˜
a
t (pi
a)
)
dt− Z˜at (pia)dWt (3.16)
associated with the preferences of agent a using an admissible strategy pia. Assume further that (3.16)
has a unique solution for any given Ft-measurable bounded terminal condition Y˜T . Let ν ∈ R. Then,
• if pia := (pia,1, pia,2) minimizes the solution Y˜0(pia) to (3.16) for a terminal condition −Ha,
then pia := (pia,1, pia,2 − ν) is optimal for the terminal condition −(Ha + νHD);
• if pia := (pia,1, pia,2) minimizes the solution Y˜0(pia) for a terminal condition −(Ha + νHD),
then pia := (pia,1, pia,2 + ν) is optimal for the terminal condition −Ha.
Proof. We prove only the first assertion, as the second is equivalent. Let t ∈ [0, T ]. Assume that
pi∗,a ∈ Aθ is optimal for (3.16) with Y˜ aT := −Ha, i.e. for any pia ∈ Aθ one has Y˜ a0 (pi∗,a) ≤ Y˜ a0 (pia).
Define further, for any pia ∈ Aθ, the strategies
pˇia := pia − (0, ν) = (pia,1, pia,2 − ν) and pˇi∗,a := pi∗,a − (0, ν).
To show that Y a0 (pˇi
∗,a) ≤ Y a0 (pˇia) for any pˇia where Y a solves (3.16) with Y aT = −(Ha + νHD) we
first show an identity result between the BSDEs with different terminal conditions. The second step
is the optimality.
Step 1: We show that the process (Y (pˇia), Z(pˇia)) := (Y˜ a(pia)− νBθ, Z˜a(pia)− νκθ) solves BSDE
Yt(pˇi
a) = −(Ha + νHD) +
∫ T
t
g˜a (s, pˇias , Zs(pˇi
a)) ds−
∫ T
t
Zs(pˇi
a)dWs. (3.17)
To this end, we reformulate (2.6) it as a BSDE:
Bθt = H
D −
∫ T
t
〈
κθs, θs
〉
ds−
∫ T
t
κθsdWs. (3.18)
The difference between (3.16) and ν times (3.18) yields
Y˜t(pi
a)− νBθt = −(Ha + νHD) +
∫ T
t
[
g˜a(s, pias , Z˜
a
s (pi
a)) + ν
〈
κθs, θs
〉]
ds−
∫ T
t
(Z˜as (pi
a)− νκθs)dWs
⇔ Yt(pˇia) = −(Ha + νHD)−
∫ T
t
Zs(pˇi
a)dWs
+
∫ T
t
[
g˜a
(
s, pˇia + (0, ν), Zs(pˇi
a) + νκθs
)
+ ν
〈
κθs, θs
〉]
ds.
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In view of (3.3), we can manipulate the terms inside driver g˜a above and obtain
g˜a
(
·, pˇia + (0, ν), Za(pˇia) + νκθ
)
+ ν
〈
κθ, θ
〉
= ga
(
·, (Za(pˇia) + νκθ)− pˇia,1σ − (pˇia,2 + ν)κθ + λ˜a(p¯i−a,1σ + p¯i−a,2κθ))
− pˇia,1 〈σ, θ〉 − (pˇia,2 + ν)
〈
κθ, θ
〉
+ λ˜a
〈
p¯i−a,1σ + p¯i−a,2κθ, θ
〉
+ ν
〈
κθ, θ
〉
= g˜a (·, pˇia, Za(pˇia)) .
Given the assumed uniqueness of BSDE (3.16) the assertion follows.
Step 2: Given that (Y (pˇia), Z(pˇia)) solve (3.17) and that pi∗,a is the minimizing strategy for pia 7→
Y˜ a(pia), then manipulating Y (pˇia) = Y˜ a(pia)− νBθ, we have
Y0(pˇi
a) = Y˜ a0 (pi
a)− νBθ0 ≥ Y˜ a0 (pi∗,a)− νBθ0 = Y0(pˇi∗,a),
and hence pˇi∗,a := pi∗,a−(0, ν) is optimal for BSDE (3.16) with terminal condition−(Ha+νHD).
This lemma intuitively states that an agent a, owning at time t = 0 a portion νa = pia,2
0− = pi
a,2
0
of units of HD, can be regarded as being in fact endowed with Ĥa = Ha + νaHD. One then looks
only at the relative portfolio pia,2 = pia,2 − νa, which counts the derivatives bought and sold only
from time t = 0 onwards: the optimization problem is equivalent. The argument can be extended
to all other agents. We note that this reduction is only possible because we do not consider trading
constraints in this work, so that the strategies pia,2 and pia,2 are equally admissible.
For the rest of this work we assume that each agent receives at t = T a portion4 n/N of the
derivative HD. By doing so, the market clearing condition in Definition 2.4 transforms into∑
a∈A
pia,2t = 0 P⊗ λ− a.s.,
and we refer to it as the zero net supply condition.
For clarity, we recall that agent a ∈ A now assesses her risk by solving the dynamics provided by
BSDE (2.9) with terminal condition
Y aT = −
Ha + n
N
HD + V a,θT (pi
a)− λ˜a
∑
b∈A\{a}
V b,θT (pi
b)
 (3.19)
(instead of that in (2.9)). Moreover, by applying the change of variables (3.1) to BSDE (2.9) with
terminal condition (3.19), we reach
−dY˜ at = g˜a(t, piat , pi−at , Z˜at )dt− Z˜at dWt, Y˜ aT := −
(
Ha +
n
N
HD
)
, (3.20)
with g˜a given by (3.3) (and (Y˜ a, Z˜a) relates to (Y a, Za) via the change of variables (3.1)).
It is straightforward to recompile the results of Section 3.3 under the zero net supply condition.
It entails no changes is the strategies or drivers, only the terminal condition of the involved BSDEs
need to be updated from −Ha to −(Ha + nNHD) as in (3.20).
4Many possibilities for this reduction to zero net supply exist, including endowing one agent with the total amount n
of derivatives HD or endowing each agent with their initial portions of the derivative νa. We make the judicious choice
of n/N for simplicity.
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4 The equilibrium market price of external risk
In the previous section we saw how to compute the Nash equilibrium for a given market price
of risk θ = (θS , θR), without the endogenous trading constraint (market clearing condition). In this
section we solve the equilibrium problem, as posed by Definition 2.4, by finding the Equilibrium
Market Price of external Risk (EMPeR) θR.
The literature contains many general results on equilibrium in complete markets that link com-
petitive equilibria to an optimization problem for a representative agent, and this is the approach
we use here. The preferences of the representative agent are usually given by a weighted average of
the individual agents’ utility functions with the weights depending on the competitive equilibrium to
be supported by the representative agent, see [Neg60]. This dependence results in a complex fixed
point problem which renders the analysis and computation of equilibria quite cumbersome. The
many results on risk sharing under translation invariant preferences, in particular [BEK05], [JST06]
and [FK08], suggest that when the preferences are translation invariant, then all the weights are
equal. This was an effective strategy in [HPDR10] and it would be such here if λa = λ ∈ [0, 1) for
all a ∈ A.
In a market without performance concerns, [HPDR10] and [BE09] show that the infimal con-
volution of risk measures gives rise to a suitable risk measure for the representative agent which,
for g-conditional risk measures, corresponds to infimal convolution of the drivers. Due to the per-
formance concerns, we use a weighted-dilated infimal convolution, and in Theorem 4.4 we show
that indeed minimizing the risk of our representative agent is equivalent to finding a competitive
equilibrium in our market.
4.1 The representative agent
Aggregation of risk and representative agent.
Inspired by the above mentioned results and having in mind [Rüs13] (see Remark 4.5 below) we
deal with the added inter-dependency arising from the relative performance component by defining
a new risk measure ρw. For a set of weights w = (wa)a∈A (to be computed later on), we define
ρw· (X) = inf
{∑
a∈A
waρa·
(
Xa
) ∣∣∣∣ (Xa) ∈ (L∞)A : ∑
a∈A
waXa = X
}
for any X ∈ L∞. (4.1)
In the case of measures defined by BSDEs, [BEK05] shows that the measure ρw defined above by
inf-convolution of the risk measures (ρa)a∈A can be expressed again as BSDE whose driver is simply
the inf-convolution of the BSDE drivers of the risk measures (ρa)a∈A.
For the set of weights w = (wa)a∈A, we define the driver gw as the inf-convolution of the drivers
ga for (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R2,
gw(t, z) = w
(
(ga)a∈A
)
(t, z) = inf
{∑
a∈A
waga(t, za)
∣∣∣∣ ∑
a∈A
waza = z
}
, (4.2)
where the notation 
(
(ga)a∈A
)
is that of the standard inf-convolution.
Lemma 4.1. The map z 7→ gw(z·, z) is strictly convex and differentiable. Moreover, ∇zgw(·, z) = 0 has
a unique solution in z.
Proof. All properties follow from those of the drivers ga a ∈ A (see Section 2.2) in combination with
the properties of the inf-convolution operator.
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The risk of the random terminal wealth ξw, measured through ρw, is given by ρw0 (ξ
w) := Y w0
where (Y w, Zw) is the solution to the BSDE
−dY wt = gw(t, Zwt )dt− Zwt dWt, with terminal condition Y wT = −ξw. (4.3)
The weights (wa)a∈A are chosen such that
∑
aw
a = 1. In this way, the risk measure ρw associated to
the BSDE with the above driver is a monetary risk measure. Translation invariance and monotonicity
follow from the fact that the driver gw is independent of y. Convexity follows from the convexity of
gw, which in turns follows from that of the gas by the envelope theorem.
Remark 4.2. Notice that (4.2) can be rewritten
gw(t, z) = inf
{∑
a∈A
waga
(
t,
za
wa
) ∣∣∣∣ ∑
a∈A
za = z
}
.
In this way, gw is seen as the (usual) w-weighted infimal convolution of the wa-dilated drivers ga, in the
terminology from [BE09] (p.137). For more on dilated risk measures, see Proposition 3.4 in [BE09].
We compute gw for the case of entropic agents.
Example 4.3 (Entropic risk measure). For entropic agents, i.e. with drivers ga(z) = |z|
2
2γa
, one obtains
gw(z) =
|z|2
2γR
, with γR :=
∑
a∈A
waγa. (4.4)
Having defined the driver of the BSDE for the aggregated risk, we naturally identify a repre-
sentative agent having a strategy piw and associated trading gains V·(piw) =
∫ ·
0 pi
w,1
t dSt + pi
w,2
t dBt.
Direct computations on (4.1) at time t = T yield that ρwT (X) =
∑
aw
aρa(Xi) = −
∑
aw
aXi = X
and since the zero net supply reduction is effective, from (4.1) and (3.19), the representative agent
then assesses the risk of the terminal endowment given by
ξw :=
∑
a∈A
waξa =
∑
a∈A
wa
(
Ha +
n
N
HD + V aT − λ˜aV¯ −aT
)
=
∑
a∈A
wa(Ha +
n
N
HD) +
∑
a∈A
wa
(
(1 + λ˜a)V aT − λ˜a
∑
b∈A
V bT
)
=
∑
a∈A
wa(Ha +
n
N
HD) +
∑
a∈A
caVT (pi
a)
= Hw + VT (pi
w),
where ca := wa(1 + λ˜a)−∑b∈Awbλ˜b, piw = ∑a∈A capia is the representative agent’s portfolio, and
Hw :=
∑
a∈A
wa(Ha +
n
N
HD) =
n
N
HD +
∑
a∈A
waHa (4.5)
is defined as the representative agent’s endowment.
There is a certain degree of freedom in the choice of (wa). We choose them judiciously in order
to regain the zero net supply condition for the representative agent, i.e. piw,2 = 0. The weighted
sum is a priori not constant or much less equal to zero, but having it equal to zero simplifies the
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calculations later on. To this end, we choose the weights (wa)a∈A such that ca = c for any a ∈ A for
some c ∈ (0,+∞), hence the choices
wa :=
1
Λ(1 + λ˜a)
for all a ∈ A, where Λ :=
∑
a∈A
1
1 + λ˜a
. (4.6)
Direct verification yields
∑
aw
a = 1 and for all a ∈ A,
ca = c :=
1
Λ
− 1
Λ
∑
b∈A
λ˜b
1 + λ˜b
⇒ piw,2 =
∑
a∈A
capia,2 = c
∑
a∈A
pia,2 = 0,
when the zero net supply between the individual agents is satisfied.
Optimization for the representative agent and equilibrium market price of external risk.
We now show that the approach by aggregated risk and representative agent, as motivated
above, allows to identify the equilibrium market price of risk as a by-product of minimizing the risk
of the representative agent. The latter is given by the solution to BSDE (4.3) with terminal condition
Y wT = −ξw = −Hw − VT (piw), for any admissible strategy piw = (piw,1, 0).
Following Section 3, except that the agent now can only choose piw,1, we introduce the residual
risk
Y˜ wt := Y
w
t + V
w
t and accordingly Z˜
w
t := Z
w
t +
(
piw,1t σt + pi
w,2
t κt
)
.
The pair (Y˜ w, Z˜w) satisfies the BSDE with terminal condition Y˜ wT = −Hw and driver g˜w, defined for
(t, piw, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R2 × R2, by
g˜w(t, piw, z) := gw
(
t, z − (piw,1σt + piw,2κθt ))− 〈piw,1σt + piw,2κθt , θt〉 . (4.7)
The main result of this section states that minimizing the risk for the representative agent leads to
finding the EMPeR θR.
Theorem 4.4. Denote, for (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R2, by Πw,1(t, z) the unique solution p ∈ R to
gwz1 (t, z − p σt) = −θSt ,
and define, for (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R2, the minimized driver G˜w
G˜w(t, z) := g˜w
(
t,
(
Πw,1(t, z), 0
)
, z
)
= gw
(
t, z −Πw,1(t, z)σt
)
−Πw,1(t, z)σSt St θSt .
Let (Y˜ w, Z˜w) be the unique solution to the BSDE with driver G˜w and terminal condition −Hw. Define
the strategy pi∗,w· :=
(
Πw,1(·, Z˜w· ), 0
)
and define θR by
gwz2
(
t, Z˜wt − pi∗,w,1t σt
)
= −θRt .
Assume that
• existence, uniqueness and the comparison theorem hold for BSDEs with driver G˜w (for bounded
terminal conditions),
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• pi∗,w is an admissible strategy,
• θ∗ := (θS , θR) makes the density Eθt defined by (2.3) a uniformly integrable martingale,
• the market is complete, i.e. for all t ∈ [0, T ], we have κRt 6= 0 (recall (2.6)).
Then Y˜ w0 is the minimized risk for the representative agent, pi
∗,w is her optimal strategy and θ∗ is an
EMPR (cf Definition 2.4). Moreover, the minimal aggregated risk Y˜ w is linked to the individual risks
(Y˜ a)a∈A through the identity Y˜ w =
∑
aw
aY˜ a (the same holds for the control components Z˜).
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Lemma 4.1 states that the map Πw,1 exists and is well defined. The admissi-
bility of pi∗,w translates to (recall (2.7))
E
[〈
V w,θ(pi∗,w)
〉
T
]
= E
[∫ T
0
|pi∗,w,1t σSt St|2dt
]
< +∞
and is assumed to be satisfied. Also, the strategy pi∗,w satisfies the first order condition for the
representative agent by construction and hence Theorem 3.2 guarantees the optimality of pi∗,w.
It remains to prove that θ∗ is an EMPR. From Section 3, let (pia)a∈A be the Nash optimizer for
θ∗ and let (Y˜ a, Z˜a) be the solution to the BSDE (3.20) for the minimized residual risk for agent a.
We want to prove that
∑
a pi
a,2 = 0. For this, we combine the individual strategies into a strategy
pi :=
∑
a c
apia = c
∑
a pi
a and we show that pi = pi∗,w, the latter being the optimal strategy of the
representative agent. The proof is done in several steps. Define (Ŷ w, Ẑw) =
∑
a∈Aw
a(Y˜ a, Z˜a).
Step 1 - A characterization of gw. We have the following characterization for the minimum and
the minimizer in the definition of gw, Equation (4.2). For a given z and a family (za)a∈A such that∑
a z
a = z,
gw(t, z) =
∑
a∈A
waga(t, za) ⇔ gazi(t, za) = gbzi(t, zb) for all a, b ∈ A and i ∈ {1, 2}.
As a corollary, since∑
a∈A
wa
[
Z˜at −
((
pia,1t − λ˜api−a,1t
)
σt +
(
pia,2t − λ˜api−a,2t
)
κt
)]
=
∑
a∈A
waZ˜at −
((∑
a∈A
capia,1t
)
σt +
(∑
a∈A
capia,2t
)
κt
)
= Ẑwt −
(
pi1t σt + pi
2
t κt
)
,
and since the Nash optimality of (pia)a∈A implies that for all a we have
gaz1
(
t, Z˜at −
((
pia,1t − λ˜api−a,1t
)
σt +
(
pia,2t − λ˜api−a,2t
)
κt
))
= −θSt ,
gaz2
(
t, Z˜at −
((
pia,1t − λ˜api−a,1t
)
σt +
(
pia,2t − λ˜api−a,2t
)
κt
))
= −θRt ,
we have
gw
(
t, Ẑwt −
(
pi1t σt + pi
2
t κt
))
=
∑
a∈A
waga
(
t, Z˜at −
((
pia,1t − λ˜api−a,1t
)
σt +
(
pia,2t − λ˜api−a,2t
)
κt
))
.
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Step 2 - Summation of the individual BSDEs. Summing the individual agents’ BSDEs (3.20),
with minimized drivers G˜a(t, z) = g˜a(t,Πa(t, pi−at , z), z) and terminal conditions (Ha + nHD/N),
according to the weights wa, we see, using Step 1, that (Ŷ w, Ẑw) solves the BSDE
dŶ wt = −
∑
a∈A
wag˜a
(
t, Z˜at −
((
pia,1t − λ˜api−a,1t
)
σt +
(
pia,2t − λ˜api−a,2t
)
κt
))
dt+
∑
a∈A
waZ˜at dWt
= −g˜w
(
t, Ẑwt −
(
pi1t σt + pi
2
t κt
))
+ Ẑwt dWt,
with terminal condition
∑
aw
a(Ha+nHD/N) = Hw. By uniqueness we have (Ŷ w, Ẑw) = (Y˜ w, Z˜w).
Step 3 - Optimality of pi. The envelope theorem guarantees that, if a family (za)a∈A such that∑
a z
a = z is optimal in the definition (4.2) of gw, that is if gw(t, z) =
∑
aw
aga(t, za), then
gwzi(t, z) = g
a
zi(t, z
a) for all a ∈ A and i ∈ {1, 2}.
From this follows that
gwz1
(
t, Ẑwt −
(
pi1t σt + pi
2
t κt
))
= gaz1
(
t, Z˜at −
((
pia,1t − λ˜api−a,1t
)
σt +
(
pia,2t − λ˜api−a,2t
)
κt
))
= −θSt ,
gwz2
(
t, Ẑwt −
(
pi1t σt + pi
2
t κt
))
= gaz2
(
t, Z˜at −
((
pia,1t − λ˜api−a,1t
)
σt +
(
pia,2t − λ˜api−a,2t
)
κt
))
= −θRt .
Step 4 - Conclusion. We have proven with Step 3 that pi satisfies the first order condition for the
representative agent, given the MPR θ = (θS , θR). From Theorem 3.2 we infer that pi is her unique
optimal strategy pi∗,w. As a by-product, we have also proven the relationship
∑
a∈Aw
a(Y˜ a, Z˜a) =
(Y˜ w, Z˜w) between the individual, minimized, residual risk and the aggregated one.
Remark 4.5. In [Rüs13] a “weighted minimal convolution” of risk measures is introduced via(∧
ρi
)
γ
(X) := inf
{
N∑
i=1
γiρi(Xi); (Xi) ∈ A(X)
}
(see page 271, equation (11.25)) for γ = (γi) ∈ RN>0.
Observe that aggregation in our context would not work without the dilation weights 1/wa in the
argument of the driver. This can be seen in Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 4.4. The reason is that
G˜a is the sum of ga with the strategies plugged in as arguments and with an additional term with the
strategies multiplied by the weights. For the aggregation as a single strategy this adjustment is necessary.
Following on Example 4.3, we illustrate the computations of Theorem 4.4 for the special case of
entropic risk measures.
Example 4.6. With the methodology of Section 3, we find the minimized driver G˜w to be
G˜w(t, z) = −γR
2
(θSt )
2 − z1 θSt +
1
2γR
(z2)2,
with γR defined in (4.4). If (Y˜ w, Z˜w) is the solution to the BSDE with driver G˜w and terminal condition
−Hw as defined by (4.5), then the optimal strategies are
pi∗,w,1 =
Z˜w,1 + γRθ
S
σSS
, and pi∗,w,2 = 0.
The EMPeR is a by-product of the FOCs and is given by
θR = − Z˜
w
γR
. (4.8)
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4.2 A shortcut to the EMPeR in the case of entropic risk measures
In the previous subsection we gave a general result on how to find the equilibrium market price
of risk via the inf-convolution of the risk measures. In the particular case of the entropic risk mea-
sure, the general computations are considerably simpler and an easier path allows to reach EMPeR
θR without the representative agent. Although the BSDE for the representative agent derived above
will appear in the following computations, with only these computations one cannot show that the
resulting equations lead to the same concept of representative agent. In other words, optimality in
the representative agent’s economy is equivalent to a Pareto optimal risk distribution among the
individual agents – for this we have proved Theorem 4.4. This shorter path consists, as was hinted
in Section 3.3.4, in a direct linear combination of the BSDEs (3.2) with the minimized driver G˜a
given by (3.12)
Following the computations from Section 3.3.5, we see that the market clearing condition re-
quires
0 =
∑
a∈A
pi∗,a,2t =
∑
a∈A
1
1 + λ˜a
Z˜a,2t + γaθ
R
t
κRt
⇔ θRt = −
∑
a∈A
Z˜a,2t
(1+λ˜a)∑
a∈A
γa
(1+λ˜a)
= −
∑
a∈Aw
aZ˜a,2t
γR
,
if we define γR =
∑
aw
aγa, with wa = 1/(Λ(1 + λ˜a)) and Λ =
∑
a 1/(1 + λ˜
a). Notice that here we
do not need to normalize the family w = (wa) so that
∑
aw
a = 1, since we are not considering
an aggregated risk. Any rescaling Λ′ of w would give the same θR. We present it in this way for
consistency with the general case.
Now, replacing the term θR by the above value in the minimized driver given by (3.12), we find
that the optimal risk processes for each agent solve the BSDEs with driver given by
G˜a(t, Z˜At ) = −
γa
2
(
θSt
)2 − Z˜a,1θSt + 1γR Z˜a,2t
(∑
a∈A
waZ˜a,2t
)
− γa
2γ2R
(∑
a∈A
waZ˜a,2t
)2
. (4.9)
The BSDEs with these drivers form a system of N coupled BSDEs with quadratic growth, which,
in general, are difficult to solve, see [ET15], [Esp10], [FDR11] or more recently [Fre14, KP14].
Fortunately, one can take advantage of the structure of (4.9) and find a simpler BSDE for the process
(Ŷ w, Ẑw) =
∑
aw
a(Y˜ a, Z˜a). It follows easily that Ŷ wT = −
∑
aw
a(Ha +nHD/N) = Hw, as in (4.5).
Linearly combining the BSDEs (3.2) with drivers expressed as in (4.9), we find
−dŶ wt =
[
− γR
2
(
θSt
)2 − Ẑw,1t θSt + 12γR (Ẑw,2t )2
]
dt− Ẑwt dWt with Ŷ wT = −Hw. (4.10)
This is exactly the same BSDE as in Example 4.6. Given that Hw and θS are bounded, this BSDE falls
in the standard class of quadratic growth BSDE and the existence and uniqueness of (Ŷ w, Ẑw) is
easily guaranteed. This allows one to compute θR as −Ẑw,2/γR and in turn one can finally solve the
BSDEs giving the minimized risk processes for each agents, using the driver G˜a as given by (3.12).
Remark 4.7 (No trade-off between risk tolerance and performance concern rate). Each agent’s indi-
vidual preferences are specified by the parameters γa and λa, i.e. her risk tolerance and her performance
concern respectively. One may ask whether there exists a parametric relation between those parameters
such that an agent with (γa, λa) and another agent with (γb, λb) would exhibit the same preferences
and have the same optimal strategies. Indeed, in most formulas the two parameters appear as coupled.
However, one can see that the terminal condition Hw is independent of the risk tolerance parameter γ·,
hence by changing λa and γa of any one fixed agent a ∈ A, one cannot obtain the same outcome.
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5 Further results on the entropic risk measure case
In this section we investigate further the entropic risk measure case. Namely, we introduce fur-
ther structure that allows to use the theory developed in the previous section and, moreover, to
design HD such that Assumption 3.1 holds true. The ultimate goal of this section is to understand
how the concern rates λ affect prices and risks. The first two parts of the section verify that Assump-
tion 3.1 holds and the third one sheds light on the behavior of the aggregated risk and derivative
price as the parameters vary.
To ease the analysis we will assume throughout a Black-Scholes market (i.e µ, σS , θS are con-
stants). Such an assumption is not strictly necessary for the results we obtain here, but we wish to
focus on the qualitative analysis and not on obfuscating mathematical techniques. Throughout the
rest of this section the next assumption holds.
Assumption 5.1. Let Assumption 2.1 hold and set ϕD = ϕa = 0 for any a ∈ A. Let µR ∈ C([0, T ],R),
θS ∈ (0,∞) and µS , θS ∈ R. For any a ∈ A the functions hD, ha ∈ C2b
(
R2,R
)
are strictly positive and
satisfy (∂x2h
D)(x1, x2) 6= 0 for any (x1, x2) ∈ R× R.
Remark 5.2 (On notation for the section). In this section we work mainly with the representative
agent BSDE (see Example 4.6 or (4.10)) and the derivative price BSDE (3.18).
To avoid a notation overload in what the BSDE for the representative agent is concerned, we drop
the tilde notation and define (Y w, Zw) as the solution to the mentioned BSDE; not to be confused with
(4.3) which plays no role here. The solution to the derivative price BSDE is denoted by (B, κ).
5.1 The aggregated risk
The BSDE (4.10) is not difficult to analyze given the existing literature on BSDEs of quadratic
growth. Recall that θS ∈ S∞ and Y wT ∈ L∞ (since it is a weighted sum of bounded random vari-
ables). We shortly recall that D1,2 is the space of 1st order Malliavin differentiable processes and D
denotes the Malliavin derivative operator, we point the reader to Appendix A.1 for further Malliavin
calculus references.
Theorem 5.3. The BSDE (4.10) has a unique solution (Y w, Zw) ∈ (S∞ ∩ D1,2) × (HBMO ∩ D1,2).
Moreover, there exists a strictly negative function uw ∈ C0,1([0, T ]× R2,R) such that for any t ∈ [0, T ]
Y wt = u
w(t, St, Rt) and Z
w,2
t = (∂x2u
w)(t, St, Rt)b, P-a.s.. (5.1)
i) For any r, u ∈ [0, t], t ∈ [0, T ] it holds that
DW
R
u Y
w
t = D
WR
r Y
w
t P-a.s. and DW
R
u Z
w
t = D
WR
r Z
w
t P⊗ λ-a.e. (5.2)
and in particular DW
R
t Yt = Z
w
t P-a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ].
ii) There exists a constant C > 0 for any t ∈ [0, T ] such that |Zw,2t | ≤ C, i.e. Zw,2 ∈ S∞ and
∂x2u
w ∈ Cb. Moreover, θR ∈ S∞.
iii) The process DW
R
· Zw belongs to HBMO.
Proof. Let a ∈ A and 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T . Existence and uniqueness of the SDE follow from Proposition
A.3.
. Proof of i): By assumption we have Y wT ∈ L∞ and θS ∈ S∞ which allows to quote Theorem
2.6 in [IDR10] and hence that (Y w, Zw) ∈ S∞ × HBMO. Moreover, given that Y wT < 0, a standard
23
comparison principle for quadratic BSDEs (see e.g. Theorem 2.6 in [Kob00]) yields easily that
Y wt < 0 for any t ∈ [0, T ] and hence that uw < 0.
Theorem A.3 ensures that the payoffs HD and Ha, and hence Hw, are Malliavin differentiable
with bounded Malliavin derivatives. Combining this further with θS ∈ R, the Malliavin differentia-
bility of (4.10) follows from Theorem 2.9 in [IDR10]. Under Assumption 5.1 the results in [IDR10]
(or Chapter 4 of [DR11]) along with Theorem 7.6 in [AIdR10] yield the Markov property for Y w
and the parametric differentiability result for the (quadratic) BSDEs.
Since uw ∈ C0,1 by direct application of the Malliavin differential we have for 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T
DW
R
u Y
w
t = D
WR
u
(
uw(t, St, Rt)
)
= (∂x2u
w)(t, St, Rt)(D
WR
u Rt) = (∂x2u
w)(t, St, Rt)b = D
WR
t Y
w
t .
It now follows that DW
R
t Yt = D
WR
u Yt = Zt for any 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T P-a.s.
. Proof of ii): Define now the probability measure Q (equivalent to P) as
dQ
dP
= E
(
−
∫ T
0
〈
(−θSs ,
Zw,2s
γR
),dWs
〉)
. (5.3)
The measure Q is well defined since θS ∈ S∞ and Zw,2 ∈ HBMO. Then for 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T we have
(Theorem 2.9 in [IDR10])
DW
R
u Y
w
t = D
WR
u Y
w
T +
∫ T
t
[−θSsDW
R
u Z
w,1
s +
1
γR
Zw,2s D
WR
u Z
w,2
s ]ds−
∫ T
t
DW
R
u Z
w
s dWs (5.4)
⇒ DWRu Y wt = EQ[DW
R
u Y
w
T |Ft].
The results in Proposition A.3 and the definition of Y wT imply that |DW
R
u Y
w
t | < C. Path regu-
larity results for BSDEs along with their usual representation formulas (see [IDR10]) yield that
(DW
S
t Yt) = (Z
2
t ) ∈ S∞; the boundedness of ∂x2uw follows in an obvious way. As a consequence,
θR ∈ S∞ since Zw,2 ∈ S∞ and (4.8) holds.
. Proof of iii): Using now the fact that θS , Zw,2 ∈ S∞, we apply the results from Theorem 2.6
in [IDR10] to (5.4) and obtain that DW
R
· Zw ∈ HBMO. The BMO norm of DW
R
Zw depends only
on some real constants and T , γR, supu ‖DWRu Y wT ‖L∞ and ‖(θS , Zw,2)‖S∞×S∞ (see Theorem 2.6 in
[IDR10]).
In the next result we show that the mapping x2 7→ (∂x2uw)(t, x1, x2) is Lipschitz. Denote by R
and R˜ the solutions to (2.1) with R0 = r0 and R0 = r˜0 respectively; denote as well by (Y, Z) and
(Y˜ , Z˜) the solutions to BSDE (4.10) for the underlying processes R and R˜ respectively.
Proposition 5.4. For any (t, x1) ∈ [0, T ] × R the map R 3 x2 7→ (∂x2uw)(t, x1, x2) is Lipschitz
continuous uniformly in t and x1. In particular the process DW
R
Zw is P-a.s. bounded.
Proof. Let 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T and define δDY := DWRY w −DWR Y˜ w, δDZi := DWRZw,i −DWRZ˜w,i
for i ∈ {1, 2} and (intuitively) δDZ := (δDZ1, δDZ2). Then, following from (5.4) written under Q
from (5.3), we have
δDuYt = δDuYT −
∫ T
t
δDuZsdW
Q
s +
∫ T
t
1
γR
(Zw,2s − Z˜w,2s )DW
R
u Z
w,2
s ds.
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Define now the process
et := exp
{∫ t
0
1
γR
DW
R
u Z
w,2
s ds
}
, t ∈ [0, T ] with (et) ∈ Hp, ∀p ≥ 1, (5.5)
where the Hp integrability of (et) follows from Lemma A.1. Observe next that by the results of
Theorem 5.3 one has δDuYt = δDtYt = Z
w,2
t − Z˜w,2t . Applying Itô’s formula to (etδD·Yt), using the
just mentioned identity and taking Q-conditional expectations it follows at u = t = 0 that
|(∂x2uw)(0, s0, r0)− (∂x2uw)(0, s0, r˜0)| =
1
b
|(Zw,20 − Z˜w,20 )| = |
1
b
EQ [eT δD0YT ] | ≤ C|r0 − r˜0|.
The last line is a consequence of Proposition A.3 combined with the fact that EQ[epT ] (∀p ≥ 1) is
finite due to the BMO properties of DW
R
Zw,2, see Lemma A.1. The constant C is independent of
u, r0, r˜0 and s0. Although DW
R
Zw,2 is a BMO martingale under P, the integrability still carries under
Q; this is the same argument as in the final step of the proof of Lemma 3.1 in [IDR10] (see also
Lemma 2.2 and Remark 2.7 of the cited work).
The extension of the above result to the whole time interval [0, T ] follows via the Markov prop-
erty of the BSDE solution. This relates to the close link between BSDEs of the Markovian type and
certain classes of quasi-linear parabolic PDEs (see e.g. Section 4 in [EKPQ97]).
Finally, the boundedness of DW
R
Zw follows from the Lipschitz property of x2 7→ (∂x2uw)(·, ·, x2)
and the boundedness of DW
R
R, see Proposition A.3, ii).
5.2 The EMPR and the derivative’s BSDE
The next result shows that Assumption (5.1) implies Assumption 3.1 holds.
Theorem 5.5 (Market completion). The derivative HD completes the market, i.e. κR 6= 0 P-a.s. for
any t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, κR ∈ S∞ and sgn(κRt ) = sgn(b∂x2hD) for any t ∈ [0, T ].
Before proving the above result we need an intermediary one. Recall that BSDE (3.18) describes
the dynamics of the price process Bθ, that HD ∈ L∞ and θ ∈ S∞ × (HBMO ∩ D1,2) (following from
Assumption 5.1 and Theorem 5.3).
Proposition 5.6. The pair (B, κ) belong to (S∞∩D1,2)×(HBMO∩D1,2) and their Malliavin derivatives
satisfy for 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T the dynamics
DW
R
u B
θ
t = D
WR
u H
D −
∫ T
t
κRs D
WR
u θ
R
s +
〈
θs, D
WR
u κ
θ
s
〉
ds−
∫ T
t
DW
R
u κ
θ
sdWs. (5.6)
The representation DW
R
t B
θ
t = κ
R
t holds P-a.s. for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Proof. Let 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T . Observe that BSDE (3.18) is a BSDE with a linear driver and a
bounded terminal condition (throughout ν = 1). The existence and uniqueness of a solution fol-
lows from the results of [EKPQ97]. Moreover, the estimation techniques used in [IDR10] yield that
(B, κ) ∈ S∞×HBMO (see Theorem 2.6 in [IDR10]). The Malliavin differentiability of (B, κ) follows
from Proposition 5.3 in [EKPQ97] and the remark following it since (θS , θR) ∈ R × (S∞ ∩ D1,2)
(see Theorem 5.3). The quoted result and Proposition A.3 yield (5.6) for DW
R
Bθ. Moreover, from
Theorem 2.9 in [IDR10] we have limu↗tDW
R
u B
θ
t = κ
R
t for 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T P⊗ λ-a.e..
We now prove a finer result onB and κ, namely thatDW
R
t B
θ
t = κ
R
t holds P-a.s. for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T
instead of just P⊗ λ-a.e.. This is done by showing that (u, t) 7→ DWRu Bθt is jointly continuous.
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Remark that the map t 7→ DWRu Bθt for u ≤ t is given by (5.6) and hence it is continuous in time
(∀t ∈ [u, T ]). Note now that Proposition 5.4 and Proposition A.3 yield that DWRZw,2 is bounded
and DW
R
u Z
w,2
t = D
WR
r Z
w,2
t = D
WR
0 Z
w,2
t for any 0 ≤ u, r ≤ t ≤ T . These properties hold as well for
θR via the identity −γRθR = Zw,2.
Using the measure Pθ (introduced in (2.3)), the fact that DWRθS = 0 and the identity −γRθR =
Zw,2 one can rewrite (5.6) as
DW
R
u B
θ
t = D
WR
u H
D +
1
γR
∫ T
t
κRs D
WR
u Z
w,2
s ds−
∫ T
t
DW
R
u κ
θ
sdW
θ
s . (5.7)
Writing the same BSDE as above, but for a parameter v (instead of u) we have
DW
R
v B
θ
t = D
WR
v H
D +
1
γR
∫ T
t
κRs D
WR
v Z
w,2
s ds−
∫ T
t
DW
R
v κ
θ
sdW
θ
s
= DW
R
u H
D +
1
γR
∫ T
t
κRs D
WR
u Z
w,2
s ds−
∫ T
t
DW
R
v κ
θ
sdW
θ
s ,
where we used the results of Proposition A.3. Since the solution to (5.7) is unique and the BSDE just
above has exactly the same parameters as (5.7), we must conclude that for any t ∈ [0, T ] and for
0 ≤ u, r ≤ t it holds DWRu Bθt = DW
R
r B
θ
t . From the continuity of t 7→ DW
R
· Bθt follows now the joint
continuity of (u, t) 7→ DWRu Bθt in its time parameters and hence the representation DW
R
t B
θ
t = κ
R
t
holds P-a.s. for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
We can now prove Theorem 5.5.
Proof of Theorem 5.5. We proceed in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 5.4. The argument
goes as follows: define the process (et) just like in (5.5); apply Itô’s formula to (etDW
R
· Bθt ) and write
the resulting equation under Pθ (just like (5.7)); take Pθ conditional expectations. At this point a
remaining Lebesgue integral is still in the dynamics:
DW
R
u B
θ
t = (et)
−1Eθ
[
eTD
WR
u H
D +
1
γR
∫ T
t
es(κ
R
s −DW
R
u B
θ
s )D
WR
u Z
w,2
s ds|Ft
]
= (et)
−1Eθ
[
eTD
WR
u H
D|Ft
]
,
where from the first to the second line we used Proposition 5.6, i.e. that κRs = D
WR
s B
θ
s = D
WR
u B
θ
s
P-a.s. for any 0 ≤ u ≤ s ≤ T .
Moreover, using Proposition A.3 we conclude that the boundedness of DW
R
· HD implies that
of (DW
R
· Bθt ) and hence that of (κRt ). Since b∂x2hD 6= 0 and since is continuous in its variables, it
follows that κR 6= 0 P-a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Finally, sgn(κR· ) = sgn(b∂x2hD).
5.3 Parameter Analysis
It is possible to justify at a theoretical level some of the predictable behavior of the processes
Y w, Bθ and θR with relation to the problem’s parameters: n, γR, λa and γa for a ∈ A.
Theorem 5.7. Let θ be the EMPR. The process (Y w, Zw) solving BSDE (4.10) is differentiable with
relation to λa for any a ∈ A, n and γR (see (4.4) and (4.6)).
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Fix agent a ∈ A. If the differences
γR − γa and Eθ
[(∑
b∈A
wbHb
)
−Ha
]
(5.8)
are positive (negative respectively) then ∂
λ˜a
Y wt is negative (positive respectively) for any t ∈ [0, T ].
For any a ∈ A we have P-a.s that
∂γRY
w
t < 0, ∂γaY
w
t < 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ).
Furthermore, P-a.s
∂nY
w
t < 0, sgn(∂nθ
R
t ) = sgn(b∂x2h
D) ∀t ∈ [0, T ] and ∂nBθt < 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ).
Part of the results are in some way expected. Introducing more derivatives leads to an overall
risk reduction and as more derivatives are placed in the market the less the derivative is worth. If γR
is interpreted as the representative agents’ risk tolerance, then as γR increases we have a decrease
in risk (Y w decreases) since it represents an increase in the single agents’ risk tolerance (i.e. γa ↗).
The main message of the above theorem is that the effect of the performance concern of one
agent on the aggregate risk depends essentially on how the agent is positioned with respect to
the others, both in terms of risk tolerance as well as the personal endowments. If the agent’s risk
tolerance γa is higher than the aggregate risk tolerance γR and her endowment position dominates
by the aggregate endowment position, then an increase in the agent’s concern rate leads to an
increase of the aggregate risk.
Before proving the above result we remark that condition (5.8) simplifies under certain con-
ditions; such simplifications are summarized in the below corollary. All results follow by direct
manipulation of the involved quantities.
Corollary 5.8. Let the conditions of Theorem 5.7 hold. If γa = γ for all a ∈ A, then γR − γa =
γ
(∑
aw
a − 1) = 0.
If N = 2, then wa + wb = 1⇔ wb = 1− wa and hence(∑
c∈A
wcHc
)−Ha = −wb(Ha −Hb) and (∑
c∈A
wcHc
)−Hb = wa(Ha −Hb).
Similarly γR − γa = −wb(γa − γb) and γR − γb = wa(γa − γb). Moreover, it holds that
sgn
(
∂λaY
w
t
)
= −sgn
(
∂λbY
w
t
)
P-a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.9)
Proof of Theorem 5.7. Let a ∈ A and t ∈ [0, T ]. Theorem 3.1.9 in [DR11] (see also Theorem 2.8 in
[IDR10]) ensures the differentiability of BSDE (4.10) with respect to γR, γa, λa and n.
. The derivative of Y w in γR: Applying ∂γR to BSDE (4.10) and writing it under the probability
measure Q defined in (5.3) yields the dynamics
∂γRY
w
t = 0 +
∫ T
t
[
−1
2
(θSs )
2 − 1
2γ2R
(
Zw,2s
)2]
ds−
∫ T
t
∂γRZ
w
s dW
Q
s .
Taking Q-conditional expectations and noticing that the Lebesgue integral term is strictly negative
for any t ∈ [0, T ), we have then ∂γRY wt < 0 for any t ∈ [0, T ).
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. The derivative of Y w in γa: This case follows from the previous one as γR is defined by (4.4)
and the weights w· (see (4.6)) are independent of γ·.
γR :=
∑
a∈A
waγa implies ∂γaγR = w
a > 0,
and finally ∂γaY
w = ∂γRY
w · ∂γa(γR). The statement follows.
. The derivatives of Y w in λ˜a: We compute only the derivatives with respect to λ˜a in order to
present simplified calculations as λ˜a := λa/(N − 1). Calculating the involved derivatives leads to
∂
λ˜a
1
1 + λ˜a
= −(Λwa)2, ∂
λ˜a
1
Λ
= (wa)2, ∂
λ˜a
wa = (wa)2Λ(wa − 1), ∂
λ˜a
wb = (wa)2Λwb,
∂
λ˜a
γR = ∂λ˜a
∑
b∈A
wbγb = (w
a)2Λ(γR − γa) and ∂λ˜aHw = (wa)2Λ
((∑
b∈A
wbHb
)−Ha).
Combining the above results with the BSDE for ∂
λ˜a
Y w under the Q-measure (just as in the previous
two steps) yields
∂
λ˜a
Y wt = −(wa)2ΛEQ
[((∑
b∈A
wbHb
)−Ha)+ (γR − γa)∫ T
t
[1
2
(θSs )
2 +
1
2γ2R
(
Zw,2s
)2 ]
ds
∣∣∣Ft].
Since Q is equivalent to P, the statement follows.
. The derivative of Y w in n: Applying ∂n to BSDE (4.10) and writing it under the probability
measure Q defined in (5.3) yields the dynamics
∂nY
w
t = ∂nY
w
T −
∫ T
t
∂nZ
w
s dW
Q
s ⇒ ∂nY wt = EQ[∂nY wT |Ft] = −
EQ[HD|Ft]
N
∑
a∈A
wa < 0,
where the last sign follows from the definition of Y wT and H
D.
. The derivative of θR in n: The analysis of Zw,2 and hence of θR with respect to n and γR follows
from the analysis of (5.4). Given representation (4.8), applying ∂n to BSDE (5.4) and writing it
under the probability measure Q defined in (5.3) yields the dynamics
∂nD
WR
u Y
w
t = ∂nD
WR
u Y
w
T −
∫ T
t
∂nD
WR
u Z
w
s dW
Q
s +
∫ T
t
[
1
γR
DW
R
u Z
w,2
s ∂nZ
w,2
s ]ds
⇔ ∂nZw,2t = ∂nDW
R
u Y
w
T −
∫ T
t
∂nD
WR
u Z
w
s dW
Q
s +
∫ T
t
[
1
γR
DW
R
u Z
w,2
s ∂nZ
w,2
s ]ds
⇔ ∂nZw,2t = (et)−1EQ
[
eT∂nD
WR
u Y
w
T |Ft
]
,
where (et) is as in (5.5) and the argumentation is similar to that back there.
Notice now that
∂nD
WR
t Y
w
T = −
1
N
(∑
a∈A
wa
)
DW
R
t H
D = − 1
N
(∑
a∈A
wa
)
b(∂x2h
D)(ST , RT ).
Given Assumption 5.1, we are able to conclude that sgn(Zw,2t ) = −sgn(b∂x2hD), and hence, from
(4.8) that sgn(∂nθRt ) = sgn(b∂x2h
D).
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. The derivative of Bθ in n: We use justifications similar to those used in Proposition 5.6 and
hence we do not give all the details. Recall (3.18), apply the ∂n-operator to the equation and do the
usual change of measure (with Pθ) to obtain
∂nB
θ
t = 0−
∫ T
t
κRs ∂nθ
R
s ds−
∫ T
t
∂nκ
θ
sdW
θ
s ⇔ ∂nBθt = −Eθ[
∫ T
t
κRs ∂nθ
R
s ds].
By the previous result we have sgn(∂nθRt ) = sgn(b∂x2h
D) and from Theorem 5.5 we have sgn(κRt ) =
sgn(b∂x2h
D). It easily follows that ∂nBθt < 0.
Unfortunately the conditions used above do not allow for similar results on the behavior of, say
γR 7→ θR or (γR, n, λ) 7→ Y˜ a. The conditions required for such results are too restrictive to be of any
usefulness. Nonetheless, we will investigate them in Section 6 via numerical simulation.
6 Study of a particular model with two agents
In this section, we investigate in detail a model economy consisting of two agents using entropic
risk measures and having opposite exposures to the external non-financial risk. We give particular
attention to the impact of the relative performance concern rates on the equilibrium related pro-
cesses. The model is sufficiently simple to allow extended tractability, when compared with Sections
3, 4 and 5, and nonetheless still sufficiently general as to produce a rich set of results and inter-
pretations. In particular, we are able to explicitly describe the structure of the equilibrium. Using
numerical simulations, we are able to explore the dependence of individual quantities (such as the
optimal portfolios pi∗a and minimized risks Y a0 ) on the various parameters, thus complementing the
results in Theorem 5.7.
6.1 The particular model and numerical methodology
We consider a stylized market consisting of two agents. We argue that a larger set of N agents
with certain exposures to the external risk R can be clustered in two groups: those profiting from
the high values of R and those profiting from the low values of R, and we can apply the weighted
aggregation technique used in Section 4 to each group. Our two agents can therefore be thought
of as representative agents for each group. The external risk process is taken to be the temperature
affecting the two agents, who also have access to a stock market.
Temperature and Stock models
We study one period of T = 1 month where the temperatures follow an SDE (2.1) with constant
coefficients:
Rt = r0 + µ
R t+ bWRt ,
and for the stock we take a standard Black–Scholes model:
dSt
St
= µSdt+ σSdWSt ,
where the coefficients are r0 = 18, µR = 2 and b = 4 for the temperature process, and S0 = 50,
µS = −0.2 and σS = 0.25 (so θS = µS/σS = −0.8) for the stock price process.
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Agents’ parameters, endowments and the derivative
Define I(x) := 1pi arctan(x) +
1
2 ∈ [0, 1]. The agents’ endowments, Ha and Hb, are taken to be
Ha = 5 + I
(
2
(
RT − 24
)) · 15,
Hb = 5 + I
(
2
(
16−RT
)) · (15 + 5 I(ST − 40)).
Agent a profits from higher temperatures while agent b profits from lower ones. The derivative has
a payoff HD that does not depend on the stock S, and is given by
HD = I(RT − 20),
so that it allows to transfer purely the external risk. All functions satisfy Assumptions 2.1 and 5.1.
Given the agents’ opposite exposures to RT and the design of HD, agent a will act as a seller while
agent b will act as the buyer, thus establishing a viable market for the derivative.
We assume throughout that the total supply of derivative is zero, n = 0, i.e. every unit of
derivative one agent owns is underwritten by the other. The risk tolerance coefficients of the agents
are fixed at γa = γb = 1 unless we are analyzing some behavior with respect to them. Similarly,
unless otherwise specified, the concern rates are fixed to be λa = λb = 0.25 unless we are analyzing
some behavior with respect to them.
The numerical procedure
The simulation of the involved processes involves a time discretization and Monte Carlo simula-
tions. The forward processes have explicit solutions and we use them directly. All BSDEs are solved
numerically. Regarding their time discretization, we use a standard backward Euler scheme, see
[BT04], and we complement the time-discretization procedure with the control variate technique
stated in Section 5.4.2 of [LRS14]. The approximation of the conditional expectations in the back-
ward induction steps is done via projection over basis functions, see the Least-Squares Monte Carlo
method used in [GT14].
We follow the methodologies in Sections 3 and 4. First, we solve the representative agent’s
BSDE (4.10). This yields via (4.8) the EMPeR process θR. Once this is obtained, we solve the BSDE
for the price Bθ of the derivative, Equation (3.18), obtaining (κS , κR) in the process. Finally, we
solve the BSDE (3.20) with driver (3.12) for each agent a ∈ A and compute the optimal strategies
pi∗,a = (pi∗,a,1, pi∗,a,2) via (3.13) and (3.14). We note that in the case of two agents, the system (3.13)
is easily inverted.
All plots below are computed using 200.000 simulated paths along a uniform time-discretization
grid of 20 time-steps, except the plot of Figure 6.1 which uses 30 time-steps.
6.2 Analysis of the behavior in the model
Figure 6.1 shows a realization of the behavior of the agents over the trading period. One can
see that the price of the derivative moves like the temperature, and in particular it is never constant
(over a time-interval where the temperature has changed). This means that the derivative does
indeed complete the market by providing the agents full exposure to R, or equivalently to WR –
Assumption 3.1 is satisfied. Agent b is always long in the derivative and a always short (the latter
following from the former since her position is the opposite of that of b). The fact that both agents
only go short in the stock is due to its decreasing trend (θS < 0) and the fact that the endowments
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depend little on S: it is in mainly an optimal investment in the stock that is observed. However
agent b’s endowment is higher for lower stock prices, hence she does not go as short in the stock as
agent a, to hedge this variability.
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Figure 6.1: Sample paths of the several processes. Stock price on the top left; the temperature and
the derivative price on the top right; the investment strategy in the stock on the bottom left and
that in the derivative on the bottom right, for each agent. Here λa = 0.25 and λb = 0.0.
Trading activity
The optimal investment strategies for the derivative were seen in Section 3.3.6 and are given by
pi∗,a,2 =
1
1 + λa
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
and pi∗,b,2 =
1
1 + λb
Z˜b,2 + γbθ
R
κR
.
The optimal investment strategies in the stock follow easily by inverting A2 from (3.9). This yields pi
∗,a,1
pi∗,b,1
 =

1
1− λaλb
λa
1− λaλb
λb
1− λaλb
1
1− λaλb


Z˜a,1 + γaθ
S
σSS
− Z˜
a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
κS
σSS
Z˜b,1 + γbθ
S
σSS
− Z˜
b,2 + γbθ
R
κR
κS
σSS
 .
Remark 6.1 (On the structure of the equilibrium). The structure of the optimal strategy for the invest-
ment in the stock appears clearly in view of the examples treated in Section 3.3. Each agent computes her
strategy as a weighted sum of the way both would compute theirs if there was no relative performance
concern (compare with Section 3.3.3), using the weights
(
1
1−λaλb ,
λa
1−λaλb
)
for a and
(
λb
1−λaλb ,
1
1−λaλb
)
for b.
These weights can be understood from Equation (3.13) with A = {a, b}: each agent’s best response
is to invest in the stock according to her natural strategy plus λi times the strategy played by the other.
Assume now that each agent was initially planning to compute her optimal position using
pi(0),i,1 =
Z˜i,1 + γiθ
S
σSS
− Z˜
i,2 + γiθ
R
κR
κS
σSS
,
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and that they are shown, in turn, the strategy that the other is about to play, so that they can update
theirs, yielding a sequence of strategies pi(1),a,1, pi(1),b,1, pi(2),a,1, pi(2),b,1, pi(3),a,1, . . . for each agent (start-
ing with a’s update). Because they both update their strategy according to Equation (3.13), we observe
agent a imitating part of agent b, imitating part of agent a, imitating part of agent b, etc. Summing the
corresponding series, agent a ends up investing according to
∑
n(λ
aλb)n pi(0),a,1+λa
∑
n(λ
aλb)npi(0),b,1,
and similarly for b.
The structure of the optimal investment in the derivative is much different, following fundamentally
from the endogenous trading condition. If an agent is shown the strategy that the other had decided to
follow, she could not unilaterally change her strategy. From this emerges the EMPeR θR – see below.
We now look at the behavior of the individual portfolios with respect to the rates of relative
performance concern. The intensity of the trading activity at time t = 0 on both the stock (pi∗,a,10 )
and the derivative (pi∗,a,20 ) as maps of the concern rates λ
a, λb can be found in Figure 6.2. The
positions of agent b are similar in some sense: for the stock, the surface looks very similar; for the
derivative, it is the exact opposite (due to the zero net supply condition). For readability we plot
only the position of agent a.
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Figure 6.2: Initial number pia,10 and pi
a,2
0 of shares of stock (left) and derivative (right) held by agent
a, as a function of (λa, λb). For visualization purposes the axes on the left picture were inverted.
The observed behavior in Figure 6.2 is in line with the intuitive idea that the more the agents
are concerned (high λi) with their relative performance V iT − V jT , j 6= i ∈ {a, b} (recall (1.1)), the
more they will invest in a way that neutralizes this source of risk. This is done by adopting a trading
strategy that is as close as possible to that of the other agent.
For the stock, we see from the formulas in Remark 6.1 that when λaλb < 1, the process of a
imitating b imitating a, etc, results in a finite position. But the volume increases with both λa and λb,
and explodes as (λa, λb)→ (1, 1). In our example they would both (short-)sell infinitely many shares
of the stock. Note that this is possible only because the stock is assumed to be exogenously priced
and perfectly liquid. For the derivative, they cannot imitate each other and position themselves
in the same direction, as the zero net supply condition implies that the agents must hold exactly
opposite positions. Agent b’s gains on trading the derivative will be exactly agent a’s losses. The
only way to reduce the difference in performances for a very concerned agent is to engage less (in
volume) in the trading of the derivative. The market clearing condition then forces the other agent
to also trade less (in volume). This is seen from the factor 1/(1 + λi) in the formulas in Remark 6.1
and is confirmed in Figure 6.2 (on the right) where agent a, identified as the seller, ends up selling
fewer units of the derivative as either concern rate increases. Due to the market clearing condition
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between the agents, no explosion is possible.
Price of the derivative
Figure 6.3 shows an opposite dependence of the derivative’s price Bθ0 on the concern rates λ
a, λb,
a behavior not captured by Theorem 5.7. One can make sense of this effect by having in mind Figure
6.2. A higher λa implies that agent a wants to trade less and, as she is the seller, this drives the price
up. Symmetrically, a higher λb implies that agent b wants to trade less and, as she is the buyer, this
drives the price down.
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Figure 6.3: Initial price of the derivative, Bθ0 , as map of (λ
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Aggregated risk
Figure 6.4 confirms the analytical results of Theorem 5.7. First note that γa = γb = 1 and so
condition (5.8) simplifies (see Corollary 5.8). As predicted, the increase of the risk tolerances lead
to a decrease in the aggregated risk (see Figure 6.4, left picture). The picture on the right shows
clearly the cross behavior stated in (5.9).
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Figure 6.4: Aggregated risk Y w0 as a function of (γa, γb) (left) and of (λ
a, λb) (right).
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Risk of each agent
Theorem 5.7 does not capture the behavior of each agent’s risk assessment as a function of the
concern rates λ·. Figure 6.5 portrays the risk perceptions of each agent as λa, λb change. Agent
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Figure 6.5: Risk Y a0 (left) and Y
b
0 (right) as a function of (λ
a, λb).
a’s risk Y a0 increases in λ
b and decreases in λa. A possible explanation for the latter behavior (Y a0
decreases with λa) from the perspective of, say a, and having (1.1) or (2.9) in mind is as follows.
If a gives more importance to her relative performance concern then she weighs the term V aT − V bT
more than the hedging of the random endowment or the optimization of the personal performance
and trades in a way that mimics more of what b does. The net result of this seems to be the ability
to neutralize more of the performance risk (as a fluctuation around the mean) and less ability
to neutralize the endowment risk. The former apparently carries more weight as Y a0 does indeed
decrease with λa.
The explanation of the first behavior (Y a0 increases with λ
b) seems more direct. As λb increases,
agent b engages in less trading of the derivative in order to reduce her relative performance concern,
and this affects agents a, in particular her ability to hedge Ha.
6.3 Effect of introducing the derivative
We now comment on the effects of introducing the derivative in this model market. Figure 6.6
displays the risks of the representative agent and of agent a with respect to λa and λb when no
derivative is available and when a market for it is available.
We observe in the plot on the right that adding the derivative does not change the aggregated
risk. This is clear if one views it as the risk of the representative agent: being alone by construction,
the zero net supply condition means that she must keep a zero position in the derivative, and hence
does not benefit from its presence (compare the agent of Section 3.3.2 with Example 4.6).
For an individual agent however (left plot), the availability of the derivative always leads to a
reduction of risk. We observe that in the absence of the derivative, the risk of agent a does not
depend on the concern rates. We can apply the methodology of Sections 3 and 4 to find that the
optimal porfolios of the agents in this situation are given by
pi∗,i,1t =
1
1− λaλb
γiθ
S + Z˜i,1t
σSSt
+
λi
1− λaλb
γjθ
S + Z˜j,1t
σSSt
for j 6= i ∈ {a, b},
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Figure 6.6: Left : risk Y a0 when the derivative is not available (flat surface) and when it is (tilted
surface), as a function of the concern rates (λa, λb). Right: same plot for the aggregated risk Y w0
(the two surfaces are equal).
while the minimized risk equation is given by the BSDE
dY˜ it = −
[
− 1
2
γi
(
θS
)2 − Z˜i,1t θS + 12γi (Z˜i,2)2
]
dt+ Z˜itdWt with Y˜
i
T = −H i(ST , RT ).
This shows analytically that the value of the problem, Y a0 , depends on neither λ
a nor λb while the
optimal strategy does, as was already observed in Proposition 4.1 in [FDR11].
Playing the game repeatedly leads to disaster.
The above study considers a one-period model with (continuous-time) trading until the horizon
T = 1 month. Imagine now the repetition of this trading period over time. We assume that there
are no significant changes to the agents’ endowments or the dynamics of the financial and external
risks.
At the level of the agents’ preferences, with the sole exception of the concern rates, they do not
change with time. Specifically, we assume that their risk tolerances, and consequently the entropic
risk measures ρ· used to assess their risk in (1.1), are fixed throughout; however, their concern rates
λ· over their relative performance may vary. This can account for some herding or other behavioral
mechanism: after each period, each agent can review the results of everyone’s performance, carry
this information into the next period and update their concern rate accordingly.
Figure 6.5 sheds some light on the outcome of playing this game repeatedly. Indeed, each agent
benefits from a unilateral increase of their concern rate λ while they are worse off with an increase
of the other’s concern rate. So they have an incentive to increase λ, as the trading periods are
repeated, culminating in Assumption 2.2 being violated as (λa, λb)→ (1, 1).
It is interesting to note that this drifting toward the singularity of the model, (λa, λb) = (1, 1),
is not captured by the risk assessments. Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show that Y w0 , Y
a
0 and Y
b
0 remain
bounded. At the level of the investment strategies, the trading activity in the derivative slows down
but persists. The sharing of the external risk becomes less efficient, because the agents are increas-
ingly concerned about losing out to the other, but does not disappear. However, the investment in
the stock explodes (see Figure 6.2).
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We stress that this behavior arises only after the derivative is introduced in the market. Indeed,
as shown by Figure 6.6, when the derivative is not available and the agents in A are only concerned
with the relative performance of their strategy over the market, they have no incentive to having
increasingly high concern rates. The particular shape of the surface (λa, λb) 7→ Y i0 , risk decreasing
with λi but increasing with λj , appears only when the derivative is made available. In this situation,
the agents are placed in direct interaction (by trading) in addition to the indirect one (social): each
agent makes now gains directly over the other. The final result is a potential destabilization of the
stock market.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we analyzed the effect of a form of social interaction between agents on an equi-
librium pricing mechanism. Specifically, we considered the pricing of a (market-completing) deriva-
tive introduced to allow market participants to share the risk associated with an external and non-
tradable risk factor. The social interaction here takes the form of concerns over relative performance.
From a theoretical point of view, we have shown how to solve the problem for general risk mea-
sures and a finite number of agents, when assuming that the derivative completes the market. This
involves solving a coupled system of quadratic BSDEs. Due to the heterogeneous rates of concerns of
the agents, the risks of the agents cannot be aggregated by the usual infimal convolution technique,
so we developed it further and introduced the weighted-dilated infimal convolution variant.
We then focused on the particular case of the entropic risk measure and were able to determine
sufficient conditions to design a derivative that completes the market. In a market model with two
agents representing opposite profiles of exposure to the external risk, we explored the impact of the
social interactions on the benefit brought by financial innovation.
We found that the introduction of the derivative always reduces the risk, at the level of individual
agents. However, the particular distribution of this risk reduction means that both agents have an
incentive to become more concerned with their relative performance. At the global level, while this
merely decreases the volume of derivatives exchanged, this leads to an explosion of the volumes
traded in the previously-existing financial asset. In practice, the assumption that the agents are small
and that the price dynamics of the stock is independent of their actions fails to hold. Thus, although
the stock price is fundamentally independent of the external risk, introducing the derivative can
lead to unintended consequences on what was a stable stock market.
We stress that this phenomenon is not captured by the risk measures. Therefore one should not
only use the performance of the risk measure when evaluating the possible benefits of a new pol-
icy (the introduction of the derivative, here). This also stresses the importance of having systemic
view: studying the problem from the point of view of an individual investor shows that the avail-
ability of the derivative is always beneficial, but at the global level the picture has strong nuances.
Strongly undesirable endogenous phenomena can emerge in the dynamics, arising essentially from
the interaction between the various agents and their possibility to adapt to the new policy.
A Stochastic analysis: notation, spaces and base results
Spaces & Notations
We define the following spaces for p > 1, q ≥ 1, n,m, d, k ∈ N: C0,n([0, T ] × Rd,Rk) is the
space of continuous functions endowed with the ‖·‖∞-norm that are n-times continuously differ-
entiable in the spatial variable; C0,nb contains all bounded functions of C
0,n; the first superscript 0
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is dropped for functions independent of time; Lp(Ft,Rd), t ∈ [0, T ], is the space of d-dimensional
Ft-measurable random variables X with norm ‖X‖Lp = E[ |X|p]1/p < ∞; L∞ refers to the subset
of essentially bounded random variables; Sp([0, T ] × Rd) is the space of d-dimensional measurable
F -adapted processes Y satisfying ‖Y ‖Sp = E[supt∈[0,T ] |Yt|p]1/p < ∞; S∞ refers to the subset of
Sp(Rd) of uniformly bounded processes; Hp([0, T ] × Rn×d) is the space of d-dimensional measur-
able F -adapted processes Z satisfying ‖Z‖Hp = E[
(∫ T
0 |Zs|2ds
)p/2
]1/p < ∞; We denote HBMO as
the space of processes Z ∈ Hp for any p ≥ 2 such that for some constant KBMO > 0
sup
τ∈T[0,T ]
∥∥E[ ∫ T
τ
|Zs|2ds
∣∣Fτ ]∥∥∞ ≤ KBMO <∞, (A.1)
where T[0,T ] is the set of all stopping times τ ∈ [0, T ]. As an easy consequence, if Z ∈ HBMO, then∫
HdZ ∈ HBMO for any bounded adapted process H. Processes in HBMO have very convenient
properties. For more information on BMO spaces and their relation with BSDEs see Subsection 2.3
in [IDR10] or Section 10.1 in [Tou13]; we state, for reference’s sake, some of them in the next
result.
Lemma A.1. Let Z ∈ HBMO and define Φ· :=
∫ ·
0 ZsdWs. Then we have:
1) The stochastic exponential E(ΦT ) is uniformly integrable.
2) There exists a number r > 1 such that E(ΦT ) ∈ Lr. This property follows from the Reverse
Hölder inequality. The maximal r with this property can be expressed explicitly in terms of the
BMO norm of Φ·. There exists as well an upper bound for ‖E(ΦT )‖rLr depending only on T , r and
the BMO norm of Φ.
A.1 Basics of Malliavin’s calculus
We briefly introduce the main notation of the stochastic calculus of variations also known as
Malliavin’s calculus. For more details, we refer the reader to [Nua06], for its application to BSDEs
we refer to [Imk08]. Let S be the space of random variables of the form
ξ = F
(
(
∫ T
0
h1,is dW
1
s )1≤i≤n, · · · , (
∫ T
0
hd,is dW
d
s )1≤i≤n)
)
,
where F ∈ C∞b (Rn×d), h1, · · · , hn ∈ L2([0, T ];Rd), n ∈ N. To simplify notation, assume that all hj
are written as row vectors. For ξ ∈ S, we define D = (D1, · · · , Dd) : S → L2(Ω× [0, T ])d by
Diθξ =
n∑
j=1
∂F
∂xi,j
(∫ T
0
h1tdWt, . . . ,
∫ T
0
hnt dWt
)
hi,jθ , 0 ≤ θ ≤ T, 1 ≤ i ≤ d,
and for k ∈ N its k-fold iteration by D(k) = (Di1 · · ·Dik)1≤i1,··· ,ik≤d. For k ∈ N, p ≥ 1 let Dk,p be the
closure of S with respect to the norm
‖ξ‖pk,p= E
[
‖ξ‖pLp +
k∑
i=1
‖|D(k)]ξ|‖p
(Hp)i
]
.
D(k) is a closed linear operator on the space Dk,p. Observe that if ξ ∈ D1,2 is Ft-measurable, then
Dθξ = 0 for θ ∈ (t, T ]. Further denote Dk,∞ = ∩p>1Dk,p.
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We also need Malliavin’s calculus for Rm-valued smooth stochastic processes. For k ∈ N, p ≥ 1,
denote by Lk,p(Rm) the set of Rm-valued progressively measurable processes u = (u1, · · · , um) on
[0, T ]× Ω such that
i) for Lebesgue-a.a. t ∈ [0, T ], u(t, ·) ∈ (Dk,p)m;
ii) [0, T ] × Ω 3 (t, ω) 7→ D(k)u(t, ω) ∈ (L2([0, T ]1+k))d×n admits a progressively measurable
version;
iii) ‖u‖pk,p= ‖u‖pHp +
∑k
i=1 ‖Diu ‖p(Hp)1+i <∞.
Note that Jensen’s inequality gives5 for all p ≥ 2
E
[( ∫ T
0
∫ T
0
|DuXt|2dudt
) p
2
]
≤ T p/2−1
∫ T
0
‖DuX‖pHpdu. (A.2)
We recall a result from [Imk08] concerning the rule for the Malliavin differentiation of Itô integrals
which is of use in applications of Malliavin’s calculus to stochastic analysis.
Theorem A.2 (Theorem 2.3.4 in [Imk08]). Let (Xt)t∈[0,T ] ∈ H2 be an adapted process and define
Mt :=
∫ t
0 XrdWr for t ∈ [0, T ]. Then, X ∈ L1,2 if and only if Mt ∈ D1,2 for any t ∈ [0, T ].
Moreover, for any 0 ≤ s, t ≤ T we have
DsMt = Xs1{s≤t}(s) + 1{s≤t}(s)
∫ t
s
DsXrdWr.
A.2 Basic Malliavin calculus results for SDEs
With relation to the Brownian motions WR and WS , we denote the Malliavin differential oper-
ators DW
R
and DW
S
, see Appendix A.1.
Proposition A.3. Let Assumption 5.1 hold. Then SDEs (2.1) and (2.2) have a unique solution R,S ∈
Sp for any p ≥ 2 and
i) R,S ∈ D1,2. We have DWSu Rt = DW
R
u St = 0 for any t, u ∈ [0, T ] as well as
DW
R
u Rt = 1{u≤t}b and D
WS
u St = 1{u≤t}σ
SSt, t, u ∈ [0, T ]; (A.3)
ii) For any jointly measurable function ψ : [0, T ] × R × R → R that is Lipschitz (in space), it holds
that
DW
R
u
(
ψ(t, St, Rt)
)
= DW
R
r
(
ψ(t, St, Rt)
) ∀u, r ∈ [0, t], t ∈ [0, T ]. (A.4)
Furthermore,
(
DW
R
0
(
ψ(·, S·, R·)
)) ∈ S∞.
iii) HD, Ha ∈ L1,2 ∩S∞ for any a ∈ A (recall (2.4) and (2.5)). If ϕζ = 0 then there exists M > 0 for
any 0 ≤ r, u ≤ T and any ζ ∈ A ∪ {D} such that
DW
R
u H
ζ = DW
R
r H
ζ and 0 < |DWR· HD| ≤M.
5The reason behind this last inequality is that within the BSDE framework the usual tools to obtain a priori estimates
yield with much difficulty the LHS while with relative ease the RHS.
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iv) Let ζ ∈ A ∪ {D} and let r0 ∈ R. The mapping r0 7→ (DWRu Hζ) is Lipschitz continuous uniformly
in u ∈ [0, T ] for any s0 ∈ (0,+∞).
Proof. Throughout let ζ ∈ A ∪ {D}.
Proof of i) General results on SDEs follow from e.g. Section 2 in [IDR10], standard Malliavin
calculus, the fact that S is a Geometric Brownian motion and µR ∈ C([0, T ],R).
The identity DW
S
u Rt = D
WR
u St = 0 is trivial.
Proof of ii) We prove (A.4): assume ψ to be differentiable, then for u, r ∈ [0, t]
DW
R
u
(
ψ(t, St, Rt)
)
= (∂x2ψ)(t, St, Rt)b = D
WR
r
(
ψ(t, St, Rt)
)
,
where we used (A.3). Now a standard approximation by mollification delivers the two results.
Proof of iii) The form of the FT -measurable payoffs HD, Ha is quite specific and it is clear that
for 0 ≤ u ≤ T and ζ ∈ A ∪ {D}
DW
R
u H
ζ = DW
R
u
(
hζ(ST , RT )
)
+
∫ T
0
(
DW
R
u ϕ
ζ(t, St, Rt)
)
dt
=
〈
(∇hζ)(ST , RT ), (0,1{u≤T}b)
〉
+
∫ T
0
〈
(∇xϕζ)(t, St, Rt), (0,1{u≤t}b)
〉
dt
= b(∂x2h
ζ)(ST , RT ) +
∫ T
u
b(∂x2ϕ
ζ)(t, St, Rt)dt. (A.5)
The boundedness of DW
R
· Hζ follows from uniform boundedness of the derivatives of ϕζ , hζ ∈ C2b .
We can then conclude that
• if ∂x2hζ 6= 0, ∂x2ϕζ 6= 0 and sgn(∂x2hζ) = sgn(∂x2ϕζ), then it follows that DW
R
· Hζ 6= 0;
• if ϕζ = 0, then the identity DWRu Hζ = DW
R
r H
ζ follows from (A.4).
Proof of iv) We now close with the proof of the last statement. Take s0 ∈ (0,+∞) and let
r0, r˜0 ∈ R be two initial conditions for R (see (2.1)) and we denote the corresponding SDE solutions
R and R˜ respectively. We also denote Hζ and H˜ζ the random variables depending on R and R˜
respectively. Notice that due to the linear form of (2.1) it is immediate that Rt − R˜t = r0 − r˜0 for
any t ∈ [0, T ].
The properties of |DWRu Hζ − DW
R
u H˜
ζ | follow from those of ∂x2hζ and ∂x2ϕζ and (A.5). By
assumption hζ and ϕζ are twice continuously differentiable (in space) with bounded derivatives,
hence, for some K ≥ 0 (the same computations follows for ϕ)∣∣(∂x2hζ)(ST , RT )− (∂x2hζ)(ST , R˜T )∣∣ ≤ K|RT − R˜T | = K|r0 − r˜0|.
It follows that for some constant C ≥ 0 independent of the data u, s0, r0 and r˜0 one has, as required,
|DWRu Hζ −DW
R
u H˜
ζ | ≤ C|r0 − r˜0|.
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